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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Looking back at the history of the Baltic states, we see that the last ten years of the 
past century with the overall support of new international security let the three Baltic 
states get free from totalitarism and gradually liquidated the consequences of the 
Soviet occupation. The Baltic states which have had sorrowful historical experience 
and restored their independence in the beginning of 1990’s had plenty of reasons to 
look for additional security guarantees in Euroatlantic security structures in addition 
to their own capabilities. The Baltic states percieved European and transatlantic 
security, political and economic structures as a background to their development as 
modern, democratic, secure and economically strong states. 
 
Since the beginning of 1990’s the cooperation and solidarity of the three Baltic states 
– Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is a well known process in European and world 
politics. Joint movement towards the independence facilitated this cooperation. The 
”singing revolution”, common interests in defence and foreign policy area, as well as 
the integration into the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) process laid the basis for solidarity of the Baltic states. 
 
The theme of my research is ”The cooperation of the Baltic states in the security 
area”. Within this framework the role of cooperation between the Baltic states in 
security area on their way to the EU and NATO will be evaluated. It should be 
stressed that the most successful cooperation among the three Baltic states was in the 
defence area. In the above framework I discussed the opportunities and problems of 
the cooperation of the Baltic states on their way to the EU and NATO. 
 
In today’s world the cooperation is seen as an undeniable driving force of 
development and integration. The cooperation of the Baltic states was an opportunity 
to get visible in international processes, thus increasing resources and ability to be 
influential. In addition, mutual cooperation is viewed as an opportunity to expand and 
multiply security realization tools with the help or support of other members as well 
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as to build an effective defence structure. Joint defence capabilities have increased as 
a result of the Baltic cooperation, thus also strenghtening regional security.  
 
Cooperation between the Baltic states and even broadly – within the Baltic Sea 
region, was not seen as a replacement of broader integration processes (integration in 
the EU and NATO), but as a means of the successful movement towards this 
direction. The factor, thanks to which, regional projects the Baltic states received 
intellectual and financial assistance from the Western countries played an important 
role. 
 
In this thesis only integration into the EU and NATO as an option of the security 
policy solution of the Baltic states will be observed and examined.  
 
Problem definition: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the examined period were 
new, small and weak states with limited resources. That is why their freedom of 
action in international politics was strongly limited, but dependence from other actors 
in political arena was increased. The Baltic states due to their limited resouces were 
much more weaker and strongly experienced different kinds of threats and influence 
of the international environment. 
 
In order to prove that cooperation of the Baltic states in the security area was of 
considerable importance, I proceed from the following hypothesis: Cooperation 
between the Baltic states in the security area facilitated their admission to the EU and 
NATO. 
 
In order to examine the theme, problem and to prove the hypothesis the following 
objectives are put forward: 
- to examine whether cooperation between the Baltic states in security area was a 
reality; 
- to clarify whether mutual cooperation was the factor, which increased their 
chances to integrate into the EU and NATO more rapidly. 
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 Tasks: 
- To find out what factors determined the cooperation between the Baltic states? 
- To clarify which factors could be considered as facilitating Baltic cooperation? 
- To examine the chronolgy of attempts to establish regional cooperation between 
the Baltic states and problems which hindered the cooperation in the 20th century; 
- To examine what Baltic cooperation institutions were founded after the 
restoration of independence and whether they were dealing with consideration of 
security issues and coordination of cooperation; 
- To examine mutual cooperation in the area of military projects - the Baltic 
battalion (BALTBAT), the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air 
Surveillance Network (BALTNET), Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL). 
 
The research of the chosen theme begins with the exploring of the distinctive features 
of the small states. The main theoretical basis of the thesis aims to examine whether 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are small states with limited resources and ability to 
influence international politics which recognize that are unable to maintain security 
with their own forces only. This will let to find the explanation of the necessity of the 
Baltic cooperation because regional cooperation for the small states is mainly 
explained with the ability to strenghten security and increase influence on the global 
processes.  
 
The central place is dedicated to the definition of security concept because securing 
the existence, sovereignity, national identity and territorial integrity of state as well as 
the avoidance of military conflicts, is considered to be the main foreign policy 
objectives not only for small, but also for bigger states and powers. As small states are 
especially vulnerable to the threats posed by the changes in in the international 
environment. Security ensuring becomes a prior issue thus forcing small states to 
appraise different strategies, including regional cooperation, taking into account 
limited resources.  
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The second and the third part of the thesis is dedicated to the examination of external 
international environment which influenced the opportunities of the Baltic states to 
cooperate, as well as the opportunity to search for security policy solutions not only 
individually or within Northern Europe, but broader – to associate the growth of 
economic stability, welfare and security with the EU and NATO. The influence of the 
states within the Baltic Sea region, Russia, the EU and NATO on security of the 
Baltic states will be examined. 
 
In the fourth part the history of the Baltic cooperation in 20’s and 30’s and after the 
restoration of the independence will be examined as well as the factors which 
promoted and hindered the cooperation. Also practical cooperation between the Baltic 
states within the common institutional framework and the joint cooperation projects in 
the defence area will be examined in this part of the master’s thesis. 
 
Prior to the beginning of working out the thesis, existent researches, periodical 
publications, conference materials, scientific literature, documents, as well as the 
Internet resources concerning the examined theme were acquainted and studied.    
 
In order to be better oriented in multishaped and broad literature exposure, sources 
and literature used in the master’s thesis were devided into three groups – basic 
literature, periodical publications and other sources. As important sources of the first 
group literature the following should be mentioned: Small States and the Security 
Challenge in the New Europe (Knudsen 1996), Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Security (Buzan et al 2003), Livet i Hegemonens Skygge - En småstats 
sikkerhetslogikk (Kjølberg), Foreign policy and security interests of small states: 
theoretical aspects (Jundzis 1997), Regional aspects of Latvia’s security policy 
(Ozoliņa 2000), Security Communities (Adler et al 1998) which were used mainly in 
theoretical part of the thesis. 
 
Different ideas and confirmations to the ideas for the thesis were gained by the author 
examining materials of the conferences which were jointly arranged by Conrad 
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Adenauer foundation and Latvian Institute for Foreign Policy and dedicated to the 
problems and opportunities of the Baltic states.  
 
The parts on practical cooperation between the Baltic states in the area of joint 
institutions and military projects are mainly based on the published cooperation 
agreements which were signed between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as on 
the periodical publications and the Internet resources. 
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1. Small states in the international system. 
 
1.1. Distinctive features of small states. 
 
Three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are small states (Jundzis, 1996a). 
There is no universal definition of „smallness” of a state. States could be defined as 
small, middle or big compared to other states. Another issue is that other variables can 
be used to define whether a state is small or big. The division of states into small, 
middle and big depends on the problem area and is based on many criterias 
(Kjølberg:10). Quantitative parameters such as size, population, military power, and 
sometimes even gross domestic product often is used to distinguish in which from 
abovementioned categories a state could be included. It is mentioning that division 
based on the quantitative parameters is subjective and is often based on the personal 
conception and perception. Another question is whether being small means also being 
weak? According to empirical evidence many states that are small by size (e.g. 
Austria, Israel, Denmark and the like) are by no means weak, but rather strong if 
looking to well-functioning political institutions.  
 
The division of states based on qualitative methods raises another problem. The 
particularity of each makes it problematic to make a complete notion based on the 
specific criterias. According to Knudsen (Knudsen et al. 1996:5) in order to identify 
to which category a state belongs to it is necessary to compare it with its neighbours. 
Thus, each state which is smaller than its neighbour, could be classified as a small 
one. According to Krause and Singer as ”minor” (small) could be defined the states 
„whose diplomatic and material resources are so limited that their leaders focus 
mostly on the protection of their territorial integrity rather than on the pursuit of more 
far – reaching global objectives” (Krause et al 2001:16). According to this definiton 
which stresses the protection of the territorial integrity as a priority for small states, 
Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia could be assigned to this category.  
 
The definiton of smallness is not an easy task because of its tendency to be all-
encompasing. In this thesis the term ”small state” will be used as a term which 
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incorporates two sets of parameters: the first, qualitative ones – territory, population 
and economy, and the second – weak statehood which was a destinctive feature of all 
the three Baltic states during the observed period, that is poorly – functioning political 
institutions due to recently gained independence, lack of experience and limited 
resources. 
 
1.2. The place of small states in the international system.  
 
Small states, especially the new ones, are more vulnerable to the influences of 
different external and internal factors. For the most part they are not able to obtain 
stability with their own resources. If a state that lacks resources and experience wants 
to participate in the international arena to the same extent as a big one does, it will not 
be able to prevent danger to the same extent as a big one will. That is why it would be 
logically to conclude that small states are more easily influenced and threatsubjugated 
than the big ones because their means to prevent a threat are more limited.  
 
Despite the differences, small states have many common features both on the 
domestic and external level. Knudsen (Knudsen et al. 1996) brought forward six basic 
variables concerning security policy of the small states which have direct influence on 
their foreign policy; 
1) strategic significance of geographical location of a small state; 
2) the degree of tension between the dominating great powers; 
3) domestic political situation of the nearest leading great power; 
4) historical experience of relations between the small state and the neighbouring 
great power; 
5) the policy towards a small state of other, rivaling great power; 
6) existence of multilateral cooperation framework. 
 
After the end of the Cold War transformation process took place in the international 
system. A number of new small states occured and their role in the international 
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decision – making process have increased thanks to the membership in international 
organizations. Nevertheless, the existence of a small state is often threatened. 
 
Unequal position of new small states, comparing to the other states in the international 
system, as well as relative weakness, lack of experience and insecurity, make small 
states feel threatened. Danger that a small state feels may lead to instability and even 
conflict. That is why a small state is often being considered as a potential source of 
risk. The war in former Yugoslavia which threatened the stability in the whole 
Europe, could be mentioned as an example.  
 
Strict hierarchy and conformity are distinctive features of international order and each 
state, depending on power rate/volume/size, has its own place. Potential of political 
power plays an important role in the ability of a state to implement its national 
interests in the international decision-making process. The potential of big states is 
more eminent - they are able to defend their interests and rights with their own 
recourses. States with small power potential are often not able to secure the realisation 
of their own interests; they are more vulnerable to internal and external crises. 
 
The lack of resources and influence is often the main reason why small states prefer to 
search for allies among the equal ones. A possibility that states which have similar 
interests or are in a similar position will be interested in cooperation increases. The 
following groups of states could have similar interests: 
1) those, that also are small/weak; 
2) those, located in one geographic area and subjugated to similar conditions. 
 
The feeling of insecurity small states feel often emerges both from international 
instability and from the geographical and geopolitical reality. A small state being 
located next to a great power may experience great security challenges, especially if 
the big neighbour is interested in incorporation of a small state in its sphere of 
influence. Knudsen stresses that: ”insecurity is the essence of a small state’s 
existence, and never more acutely than when it is located next to a great power” 
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(Bleiere 1997: 4). On the other hand, small states may secure their stability and get 
help if a conflict situation occurs by building bilateral relations with a potential 
defender, thus, establishing assymetric patron – client relationship where a small state 
is a client and big power – patron. However, in such asymmetric reationship both a 
patron and a client have different interests. Abovementioned relationship is based on 
the assumption that a client supports its patron in the areas in which a patron is 
interested in, thus proving its loyalty and getting in return the defence of patron if a 
conflict situation takes place (Kjølberg: 14). Thus being allies with great states have 
obvious good effects on a small state because a great power – patron could defend its 
client against potential enemies. 
 
Every state is unique and what strategy it will choose to implement national interests 
will depend on domestic factors and external environment. However, a number of 
common features will increase if we analyze foreign policy of small states, dividing 
them into groups based on different criterias: new and old small states, developed and 
underdeveloped, those, which feel threatened and those, which feel relatively safe. 
East have summarized the basic features that are typical to the behaviour of small 
states. They are the following: 
- low participation level in addressing the world problems. It stems from the low 
capacity and lack of resources a small state has comparing to other actors in the 
international arena; 
- high level of support to intergovernmental organizations; 
- high participation level in intergovernmental organizations; 
- avoiding the use of military force as a tool to implement state interests; 
- avoiding the policy which may lead to alienation of the strong powers; 
- functional and georafically narrow range of concernment of foreign policy activities; 
- often appeal to moral and rights in the international arena (East 1973: 557). 
 
The abovementioned features are mostly oriented to activities on intergovernmental 
level, international organizations, as well as to ”equalization” policy, which is based 
on finding the equal ones and avoiding the use of force individually.  
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 Limited resources determine necessity of small states to use them prudently both 
domestically and on the international level. The lack of power anticipates low risk 
policy and search for opportunities to increase influence in the international system as 
well as an opportunity to realize national interests. In order to secure the existance and 
enforce realization of national interests interstate cooperation seems to be the most 
appropriate tool for a small state.  
 
As interstate cooperation is the central term in this thesis, it is necessary to make a 
notion of what cooperation is. Cooperation between states is limited and often has 
temporary nature because states do not trust each other. Realists believe that there is a 
little possibility to establish community beyond state borders; territorial states 
therefore are the only units of community. Since states often do not turst to each other 
and have different interests, it is not easy to achieve cooperation in the world politics. 
Cooperation exists depending on issues. It should be stressed that cooperation does 
not mean the absence of the conflict. It takes place in a situation that contains a 
mixture of conflicting and complementary interests (Kapustans 1998:1). This means 
that cooperation does not necessary exist in all joint arrangements. Cooperation 
requires that ”the actions of separate individuals or organizations – which are not in 
pre-existent harmony – be brought into conformity with one another through a process 
of negotiation which is often referred to as ”policy coordination” (Kapustans 1998:2). 
In other words cooperation occurs when actors recognize the existence of common 
interests and tailor their behaviour to preferences of other actors through a process of 
coordination in order to achieve common goals. It means that cooperation does not 
pressuppose full amalgamation of interests and harmony in all areas and may include 
elements of disagreement over issues.  
 
 
 
 
 
 14
1.3. Possibilities and limitations of the foreign policy of small states. 
 
Special attention in security policy of small states is vested to availability of resources 
- military, economic or diplomatic. Limited resources hinder small states to compete 
with middle- and large powers when it comes to decision - taking on the international 
level. A small state has relatively small possibility to engage in a decision-making that 
concern for example redistribution of spheres of influence. Often new and 
underdeveloped states are balancing on the line which determines the likelihood of 
survival in the international system. In a case if a problem occure, a small state has 
low ability to mobilize resources (just because often it does not have enough 
resources necessary to prevent a conflict) and will search for help among the 
”friendly” states. However, search for help in a problem developing stage could be 
too late and damage could be greater than if forces had been joined prior to a conflict 
situation. It means that joining resources with the other state is a strategy a small state 
may choose in addititon to relying on its own resources.  
 
East stresses one more important aspect in behaviour of small states which is based on 
the consideration that the typical behaviour of a small state is impulsive and direct, 
often even hostile. He identifies it as a high risk behaviour. According to East, a small 
state is not able to trace the problem in time because of the lack of resources and, 
hence, is not able to prevent it. The result is aggravation of situation and possible 
aggressive reaction. Here lies the difference in decision-making approach of small and 
big states. When being engaged in problem solving in the last moment, small states 
often behave direct and impulsive, exposing themselves to danger (East 1973: 557). 
 
Due to the limited resources and relatively little power small states tend to avoid high 
risk foreign policy activities and focus on common activities, including regional 
cooperation and membership in international organizations (Jundzis 1996a: 4). 
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Limited resources is the reason why a small state is often cautious in using its political 
capital and uses it only in situations where its vital interests are at stake. It makes a 
small state to narrow the range of problems that could be addressed. It is logically that 
domestic and regional issues will be on the top of the agenda of a small state rather 
than the global ones such as, for example, global warming. However, unwillingness to 
be left outside the world decision – making process explains why membership in 
international organizations is often the top priority in the foreign policy of small 
states. 
 
Small states tend to compensate their unequal position with the help of international 
law. Small states appeal to moral principles and norms more often than middle- and 
big powers. This strategy is often used as a main tool in the hands of a small state 
when addressing international problems (Jundzis 1996a: 4).  
 
1.4. Security concept and its meaning in the foreign policy of small states. 
 
It is difficult to define security concept and even more difficult to measure it. 
Generally we can see that security level in international politics often is bounded to 
nonexistence of insecurity. ”Security” is a concept that can change its nature. Security 
concept refers to defence of vital values in generally, not only to military threats 
against or military defence from them (Kjølberg et al 2001: 18). According to Buzan 
and Wæver a security issue refers to the threat to the survival of some referent object, 
in our case, nation state, which is claimed to have right to survive 
(Buzan et al 2003:71).  
 
Securing the existance, sovereignit, national identity and territorial integrity of a state 
as well as avoidance of military conflicts is considered to be the main foreign policy 
objectives not only for small, but also for big states and powers. Security could be 
examined in a few dimensions, depending on the analysing unit: security of a single 
individual, national, regional and international security.  
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According to Buzan security is influenced by many factors in five main sectors: 
military, political, economical, social and environmental. In a military field security 
refers mainly to interaction between military potential of states (which could be used 
both to offence and protection) and how states percieves the intentions of each other.  
 
Security in political field refers to organizational stability, administration system and 
ideology. Security in economic field refers to availability of resources, market and 
finances which are necessary for prosperity of state and maintenance of state power 
on the susceptible level.  
 
Social security is related to securing the traditional culture, language and national 
identity. Security is multishaped and varies depending on situations and conditions 
which the concept refers to. The integral notion of state security is to secure 
sovereignty (Buzan 2000: 117). 
 
Sovereignty which is the main element of existance of state, determines its position in 
the international system. Duner defines sovereignty as ”formal or juridical right to 
establish laws and to act in a certain geographical area or functional space”. The main 
attention is paid to formal aspects of sovereignty which often differs, especially when 
it comes to small states. If formally a state is a sovereign unit, in reality sovereignty of 
every state more or less depends on domestic resources and the 
environment (Bleiere et al 1996:34).  
 
Autonomy concept is used in order to characterize qualitative aspect of sovereignty. 
In general, autonomy refers to an ability of a state to influence other states in order to 
implement its national interests or an ability to implement its goals. Authonomy of 
small states is limited and is determined by the following factors: resources small 
state has in its desposition, domestic situation and limitations, which derives from 
international system. Small states are often more sensitive to external political and 
economic pressure than the big ones due to limited resources. It has to be noted that 
involvement in international organizations in most cases requires a part of 
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sovereignty. However, mutual cooperation between states could be carried out 
without the damage to such a sensitive for small states issue as sovereignty.  
 
Security concept has two dimensions: the first one is related to preserving of 
sovereignty of a state and ensuring national existence as well as territorial integrity 
and the ability of authorities to act successfully. The second dimension is related to 
attempts to reduce the risk of armed conflict and endowing low level of tension 
among the states (Jundzis 1997b:58). Autonomy limitations lead to assymentry in 
interstate relations. These limitations are related to the differnece of potencial and 
unbalanced politics of a weaker state, limited resources and insufficient economic 
development. In order to secure high degree of autonomy the establishment of 
symmetry is sufficient. 
 
A small state neighbouring big one will always be a subject to assymetrical relations, 
hence, to threat risk. It confirms an assertion that it will be gradually more difficult for 
a small state to prevent threats. It is not possible to eliminate the assymetry entirely, 
thus ways to prevent the growth of assymetry and thereby threats, is of importance for 
a small state.  
 
Peaceful co-existence of a small and a big state is possible if the following conditions 
are fulfilled:  
1) small state is startegically unimportant to a big state;  
2) stable democracy in both states, especially in a big state. 
 
Foreign policy implementation of a big state towards a smaller neighbouring state is 
often an exercise of politcal power which derives from a substance of a big state. That 
is why small states are searching for options to increase security guarantees. If a state 
is admitted and ”feels” small in comparison with its neighbour, and in addition 
recognizes limitation of own resources, an element of insecurity will be present. This 
justifies an assumption that small states tend to cooperate in order to multiply 
resources and get in their disposition security guarantiing tools.  
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1.5. Cooperation within the regional security framework: benefits of small states.  
 
Region formation is one of the dominating tendencies in the international system 
today. Region formation is a global phenomenon – deepening of regional cooperation 
and regional engagement is a distinctive feature of international system. Increasing 
number of actors in international system is among the reasons why regional 
cooperation is developing. Another possible explanation is that many ambitions states 
have could be easily accomplished cooperating on the regional level than on the 
global one.   
 
Region concept refers to a specific formation which combines totality of both internal 
and external conditions and elements. Despite the variety of definitions of the the term 
region, it is possible to trace some similarities. A region usually has four features: 
geographical closeness, common links (ethnic, cultural, linguistic, social and historic), 
interaction in international level and awareness of identity (Cantori et al: 1970). 
According to Buzan and Wæver region refers ”to the level where states or other units 
link together suffuciently likely that their securities cannot be considered separate 
from each other” (Buzan et al 2003: 43). In general, a region is a creation formed by 
state or non state actors between which an interaction takes place in one or few 
spheres and which are unified by the common objectives and means to gain those 
objectives as well as by territorial closeness.  
 
A region is a creation where few states accumulate their resources, thus increasing 
options to gain influence on the global level. Region security cooperation anticipates 
coopeartion among a group of geographically bounded states concerning security 
issues. Regional ccoperation allows to strenghten security of a state by accumulating 
resources without limiting its autonomy. This fact is considered to be important 
especially for small states to which both abovementioned questions are of great 
importance.  
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In a multipolar system opportunities for cooperation have increased. New ways to 
fulfil objectives have opened and regional cooperation is considered to be one of the 
means to strenghten positions in international arena and influence international 
agenda. For a small state region is an opportunity both to develop without losing 
autonomy and strengthen security positions as well as to multiply resources and the 
means to prevent possible threats. 
 
Not only states play an important role in regional cooperation. Also nongovernmental 
organizations, movements and institutions became active actors on the regional level. 
With the help of a region strategically beneficial positions could be gained in the 
international arena. Thus, it could be said, that the driving forces of regionalism are 
the groups of actors that mutually cooperate on the regional level in order to get an 
opportunity to realize their interests on the international level. It is of special 
importance to those small states which have low capacity to influence international 
agenda by their own means.   
 
Regionalism is a process in which social (language, cultural, historical, religious, 
common historical self-confidence), economical (trade models), political (regimes, 
ideology) and organizational (formal regional institute) homogenity is forming; which 
results in strengthening mutual dependence (Ozoliņa 2000e: 43).  
 
Regionalism gives the opportunity to develop mutually overlapping power structures. 
It is a sufficient feature because an overlapping power network opens to a small state 
the possibility to influence international system. The region does not exclude 
existence of national interests and international involvement at the same time. The 
clearer the objectives have actors engaged in region formation, the better they 
recognize factors that have impact on the region formation, and the greater 
opportunity region has to gain maximum results from participation on the 
international level. The advantage of regional cooperation is that actors have the 
possibility to choose participation areas according to the objectives they set and avoid 
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unwanted involvement in common arrangements, as it is in the case of alliances where 
all members have to participate in collective defence arrangements.  
 
There are few stages in region formation process. In the beginning states develop 
mutual relations; then cooperation/interaction in the particular area develops such as, 
for example, security field (so called sectoral interaction) which in the future develops 
in multilateral interaction. After strengthening relations, cooperation passes to the 
next level – integration. However, regional cooperation does not always lead to 
integration. Necessary precondition for integration is goal oriented behaviour of states 
and their disposition to cooperate.  
 
Due to globalization process region borders become vaguer and cooperation among 
several partners in order to gain maximum results with minimum resources is usual 
phenomenon. Geographic location serves more as an attraction tool, then as a strict 
precondition of one or another political unit (Ozoliņa 1999c: 11).  
 
International environment plays crucial role in region formation. It is possible to 
notice interconnection between the increasing number of regions and transformations 
that take place in the international system. Multipolarity that occured after the Cold 
War is the brightest example of how states react to changes in the international 
system. Common interests, objectives, which consolidate region actors, as well as 
similar value systems and level of political culture, are considered to be the necessary 
preconditions for effective regional cooperation (Ozoliņa 1999d: 11). Common 
features, such as similar political systems, historical experience and value systems 
states share positively influence decision - making and implementation process. It 
could be explained with the fact, that the greater is unity among the states, the greater 
is the feedback. It should be mentioned that security sustaining is considered to be a 
conjunctive objective especially for the small states because very often it is the top 
foreign policy priority for them.  
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Regional cooperation is associated not only with positive but also with some negative 
tendencies. Tight interstate cooperation on regional level on particular issues may 
become a cause of conflict among the states that carries out regional cooperation and 
states outside the region. States outside the region could have a perception that 
regional cooperation might be oriented against them. As an example could be 
mentioned Russia’s reaction to events in Baltic region. Attempts of the Baltic states to 
develop interstate cooperation on issues of strategic importance were kept under sharp 
– eyed observation of Russia.  
 
Regional cooperation could be also negatively influenced also by insufficient 
experience of states to cooperate. It may become apparent when it comes to financial 
aspects of cooperation such as expenditures and investments. This aspect is especially 
painful to new states which have difficulties to decide whether to engage in regional 
cooperation or not due to the lack of financial resources. Another reason which could 
hinder region formation is mistrust to a neighbouring state if a negative historical 
experience took place.  
 
Great concerns are linked to economic aspect. States may not be interested to 
cooperate on the regional level because they plan to strengthen economy by their own 
means. A competition is a part of market economy where individuality is preferred. 
Regionalism, in its term, foresees some kind of joint action in which investments 
should be made. Small states could fear to become economically dependent on the 
bigger states (Moshes 2002).  
 
Sovereignty could become an obstacle for regional cooperation but on the other hand, 
it could become a stimulus, proposition for region formation or engagement in it. 
Thus, it is necessary to turn to an assumption, that aspiration to secure sovereignty 
could lead to region formation or engagement in regional cooperation.  
 
A small state, when developing national identity and independent position, often 
needs support from outside. If a state is not confident about its strength, it searches for  
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the opportunities to strengthen its position with the help of other actors in the 
international system. As security is on the top of agenda especially for states which 
feel threatened, one of the possible solutions is to form a so-called security region. 
Main conditions for security region formation derive from the international 
environment where particular state is located. International system in general and 
surrounding international environment determine conditions for region formation and 
has direct influence on the objectives of the (Ozoliņa 1999b: 12). It should be stressed 
that regional balance of power and adequacy and recognition of the goals brought 
forward by the region actors is sufficient.  
 
Motives for security region formation could be different. To mention the most 
common: 
- region formation as an alternative to more extensive formation among states in 
security field; 
- security region as an addition to existent security policy; 
- region formation as a spring point in order to achieve large-scale goals; 
- membership in international organizations, where a particular level of 
preparedness is required.   
 
 
1.6. Security community. 
 
Karl Deutsch mention two types of security communities: the amalamated security 
community which is based on confluence of sovereign states into a single unit and the 
pluralistic security community where member states maintain their sovereignty 
(Deutsch: 1957). As the main objects of the analysis are the Baltic states which are 
sovereign units, further examination of security community will be limited to 
pluralistic type of security community. According to Deutsch the main requirement of 
pluralisitc security community is that ”the keeping of the peace among the 
participating units was the main political goal overshadowing all 
others” (Deutsch 1957: 31). Adler and Barnett also note that stable peace is the 
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distinctive feature of a security community and while states form a security 
community to exibit rivalry and other interactions associated with mixed-motive 
games, they no longer fear the use of violence as a mean of statescraft and a tool to 
settle mutual disputes. They also point out that mutual trust and collective identity are 
the important elements in creating security community. As security community is a 
peace community, the establisment of pluralisitc security community, which is a non 
– war community, anticipates that mutual military fears are absent at the state – to – 
state level (Adler et al 1998). According to Kasowitcz, common identities, values and 
norms is a precondition of peace in a security community, making it more 
institutionalized (Kasowicz 1994). This distinctive feature justifies the view that 
sharing identities and meanings produces peace. In the case of Europe democratic 
values are at the core of the security community. Thus, establishment of security 
community is important for states because with establishment of such a community 
they do not need to fear of being an object of military aggression. Not to mention that 
democracies do not tend to fight against each other. It is particularly relevant for the 
small states due to their limited resources, including the military ones.  
 
Another benefit for a small state being a part of security community is that it appears 
as a full-fledged actor in the international arena. It is considerably more difficult to 
reach this status acting individually taking into account such factor as limited 
resources. That is why striving for cooperation is logical behaviour of small states. 
One of the most effective means to find the place in the international system for a 
small state is through regional cooperation; by joining resources with other states 
increases its ability to influence and compete in the international arena. Regional 
cooperation could be a transitional step to integration into international organizations.  
 
Continuing the analysis, advantages of a small state taking part in regional 
cooperation should be examined. Supporter of regionalism LeRoy Bennett stresses 
that tendency towards regional cooperation among small groups of neighboring states 
which share homogeneous interests, traditions and value system is obvious. Small 
states located in one geographic area theoretically have tendency to cooperate and 
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cooperation increases if states in addition have similar goals to reach in the 
international arena. Small and weak states have tendency to cooperate more often than 
strong or big states, which are able to insure realization of interests individually. In 
addition, balance of power could be maintained when states form regional groups, 
thus retaining world’s stability (Le Roy Bennett 1988: 350).  
 
The next aspect is that there is no global authority which would be able to control 
world order as it functions on domestic level. Region could be a subsystem where 
there is a possibility to test interaction among states and possibility to reach consensus 
in different questions, including security issues. 
 
In relation to threat it is worth mentioning that states located in one geographic area 
tend to perceive local threats more seriously and consider them of equel importance 
than those, located far from the source of threat. Despite that nowadays the possibility 
of direct threats has decreased, such factors as pressure from big neighbouring state or 
economic instability could become a motive to initiate regional cooperation.  
 
Political, economic and social integration could be easily reached within limited 
geographic area. Regional integration could serve as a spring point for small states on 
their way to global integration: regional integration provides with experience how to 
cooperate as well as with greater ability to influence decision – making process on the 
international arena due to joined diplomatic, economic or military resources.  
 
 
1.7. Security policy strategies of the small states. 
 
After the end of the Cold War in the international system have occured significant 
changes. Bipolar system was replaced by multipolar system which is considered to be 
more unstabile than the bipolar one. Actors in the international system have to 
maintain security by their own means because in contrast to the domestic level there is 
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no collective institution which would provide security to all the memebrs of 
international community.  
 
Security dillema is the following – in order to maintain their security states enlarge 
which makes other states feel threatened. In a case if a small state becomes a member 
of an alliance or lean on support of a stronger state in order to maintain its security, 
there is a risk to lose a part of its autonomy. 
 
Security policy of small states reflects efforts to ensure security interests and 
influence international system. Changes in geopolitical situation on the one hand lead 
to a negative reaction of small states because of their limited ability to influence, but, 
on the other hand widen possibility for cooperation and facilitate formation and 
developement of international organizations. In each specific situation it finds an 
expression differently, but following geopolitically determined factors have influence 
on security policy of a small state: 
- if from the point of view of the big state a small state is located in startegic 
important position; 
- if a small state is strategically important or natural resources located on the 
territory of a small state attract attention of other states; 
- if a small state is located close to big or middle state (Ozoliņa 1996a:53). 
 
Geographical closeness requires high interaction level between states and differences 
in power capacities influence security of small states. In this case security could be 
both increased and reduced: if a big state is friendly a small neighbouring state will 
not experience security challenges, and otherwise, if a big state is aggressive or 
internally unstable, it could threaten security of its neighbours, especially that of a 
small state. The situation could be complicated by the fact if negative historical 
experience took place in relations of two neighbouring states.  
 
Despite the fact that small states are subjugated to the influence of international system 
and its influential actors to a greater extent than bigger states, small states also have 
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some mechanisms to influence in their disposition. What strategy a small state will 
choose: to rely on its own political, military, economic resources or to search for 
different kinds of cooperation with other states (as for example joining an alliance) will 
depend on the existence of external threats and how those threats are percepted on the 
domestic level.  
 
The realities of the world politics have to be kept in mind when a small state chooses 
foreign policy strategy. It has to be cautious when using its political capital due to 
limited resouces. That is why it must use it only in situations where its vital interests are 
at stake.  
 
Membership in international organizations has its costs and benefits. States have 
different threat perceptions and depending on their geopolitical location have different 
security challenges. In addition, domestic factors, such as political and ideological basis 
play an important role in formulating foreign policy strategy. Membership in 
international organizations is among the priorities of the foreign policy of small states 
because it allows to put the burden on national security matters to transnational level. 
However, memebrship has its costs and benefits which should be examined closer. 
 
NATO is still seen as the only organization which guarantees hard security and is able 
to protect in a case if military threats occur. The EU deals with semi – soft/semi-hard 
security issues. The EU is not an alternative to NATO because it lacks the US presence 
which is vital for European security (Setälä 2004). For new, small and weak states, such 
were the Baltic states after gaining independence, both ”soft” and ”hard” security was 
of importance. However, traditional ”hard” security was on the top of the agenda due to 
the neighbourhood of Russia and the possibility of commencement of a military 
conflict.  
 
States, especially small ones, when moving deliberately and determined towards 
membership in a military alliance, want to increase their security and power potential. 
Membership in alliance brings not only military benefits. Economic benefits in return 
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for loyality in a form of subsidies and possible investments opens for new states an 
opportunity to improve and develop defence sector. Political benefits from joining an 
alliance for small states comes in a form of possibility to take part and influence 
decision – making process in the international arena in a self - favourable ways. It 
should be stressed that satisfaction from joining ”the club” is an important factor for 
newly independent small states which make their first independent steps in 
international arena. However, security aspect is the most important for most states 
when appraising membership in alliance (Kjølberg: 18).  
 
The rules of the game define that membership in alliance means not only to get help, 
but also to help other members if a threat to their security occurs. Contribution to 
common security arrangements when necessary are required. Absence of common 
threats does not mean the absence of crises and conflict situations at all. Concerning 
NATO, new security challenges and threats caused the necessity for new means and 
methods. It required transformation and acquisition of new capabilities for the 
Alliance. Exactly small states often have problems in transfoming their capabilities 
due to limited material and human resources. These problems could be solved with 
the help of other member states. However, it can increase dependence of a small state 
on other, often bigger nation.  
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2. External environment of the Baltic states. 
 
Insecurity is on of the main features of small, weak states and should be examined in 
the context of external environment. These states are especially senstitve to features 
created by geopolitical situation which could both improve and worsen security 
situation of small states and their ability influence international processes. 
 
A situation when ”totality of external factors is especially important when a small 
state with limited resources and insufficient experience to act on the international 
arena search a place in interstate system and in addition is located close to a big state 
which maintains a model of behaviour of former empire and at the same time attempts 
to buld democratic society structures” (Ozoliņa 2000e: 80) could be reffered to the 
Baltic states.  
 
An international environment of the Baltic states is formed by Russia and 
Commonwealth of Independent States (further CIS), Baltic Sea region and Western 
democratic states.  
 
2.1. Power poles1.  
In order to evaluate the place three Baltic states occupied in the international politics 
during the examined period, it is important to realize the system of relations in which 
they operated.  
 
During the Cold War the world was dividend to two spheres of influenced controlled 
by two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, thus creating two confronting 
ideological, economical, political and military blocks, between which the ”iron 
curtain” (a line of political division) was dropped and international system was 
considered as bipolar. Moscow and Washington was two power poles with global 
attainability effect.  
                                                 
1 Power pole is a place  from which political power is distributed to outside and  which is defined as an ability 
to force someone to do something, what otherwise this „other” have not been done. Tools which are used to 
obtain this are very different, for example, warfare which is used rarely, assaults or promises of rewards. 
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The end of 1980’s, the beginning of 1990’s was a meaningful period in European 
security system because of the collapse of the bipolar system: dissapearance of the 
threat source – the USSR, two parallel international systems – socialism and 
capitalism – ceased to exist. Thus, Europe went into new quality which is linked to 
consequences of the collapse of the bipolar model. Important changes that took place 
in Germany (unified Germany with claims to become Europe’s strongest economical 
and political power), Eastern Europe (new political attempts of former socialist states 
and rebirth of nationalism and xenophobia), USSR (political stagnation and 
economic bankruptcy, but still preserving great military strength) opened possibility 
to seacrh for new cooperation forms (Hyde – Price 1992:38).  
 
Bipolar model of balance of power anticipates that two great powers dominate in the 
international system, and each of them controls its own part of the globe. Thus, the 
world was dividend among the two opposite poles which nonetheless were interlinked 
because constantly kept the activities of the other under careful observation and 
reacted to them immediately. High armament and confrontation level was a distinctive 
feature of the bipolar model. According to historical experience, bipolar model 
existed since the end of the second World War (1997-1989). The basic principle of 
the bipolar system opened to the USA the door to Europe since Europe was controlled 
by two super powers – the Soviet Union and the USA. During the existence of this 
model peace was maintained thus creating relative conditional stability. The Marshall 
plan created by the USA anticipated economic cooperation among the states. That is 
why the neccesity for institutionalized economic community became clear, thus 
determining the creation of mutual interdependence in the later years.  
 
Present reality of international relations present the evidence that return to bipolar 
world division is unlikely. Although one of the poles which is concentrated around 
NATO, is not going to collapse in the near future, though there is no other equivalent 
power in the world which in perspective could create second, diametrically opposed 
pole.  
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Security policy is linked to the formulating of security problem, which anticipates 
choosing the means of solving the security problems or eliminating the threats. 
During the Cold War it was possible to identify the source of threat very precisely 
since it was an external enemy from the opposite block of states and the bipolar 
system was dominated by the military threats. After the collapse of the bipolar system 
situation has changed. 
 
Bipolar system disappeared with the end of the Cold War accordingly radically 
changing international system in Europe. Former Western and Eastern Europe have 
lost its identity; power poles and their influence have changed. Dynamic increase of 
economic and military integration took place in Europe; the EU gathered around itself 
new member states. Thus, Brussels attained status of the power pole because of its 
status as the EU political center, but Moscow lost a great part of its power to 
influence.   
 
After the end of the Cold War it became possible to speak about the creation of ”new 
order” in the international structure. Common regional, economic, political and 
military interests and goals arose as a result of intensive cooperation in different 
world regions. Regions in this ”new order” system act as independent actors and the 
role of international organizations is increasing.  
 
2.2. Russia. 
Insecurity of the Baltic states was strenghtened by the fact that all three Baltic states 
protractedly were the members of the USSR. Due to unseccessful experience the 
Baltic states had, Russia was viewed as neighbour which behaviour is difficult to 
predict. High corruption level, great external debts, economic instabilit and 
democracity deficit was the distinctive feartures of Russia during the period examined 
in the thesis. Although in Northern Europe there was no actual risk of warfare, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, being small not so much geographically as 
demographically and economically, were located near to the former great power. 
Despite that its meaning as a great power in the world decreased, Russia still had great 
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nuclear potential. Thus, the Baltic states had a reasonable ground to search for 
security guarantees in European and transatlantic security structures in addition to 
own means. Since Russia is a part of Europe, its involvement in the European and the 
world’s processes could be viewed as a positive fact that strenghtened regional 
stability, also because of its great political influence.  
 
In their attempts to gain membership in NATO, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were 
taking into consideration actual NATO – Russia relations. However, at the same time 
they considered that these relations must not hinder their integration into NATO as 
well as to become an obstacle to gradual improving of relations with Russia. NATO 
representatives have repeatedly stressed that Russia has no determining role in NATO 
enlargement, and, the more negatively Moscow will react to potential membership of 
the Baltic states in the Alliance, the more it will hinder its integration into 
international turnover. Russia made it clear that NATO expansion to its borders is not 
acceptable. Determined aspiration of the Baltic states to become the members of the 
Alliance was percieved as a signal, that Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are searching 
for own place in the international arena, avoiding to arrive in the sphere of influence 
of Russia. Drafted in 1999 „Research of Russia’s Nongovernmental defence and 
foreign policy council” contained the view that ”due to rapid NATO enlargement 
towards the Baltic states, Russia will consider this fact as increase of direct military 
threat”. The research stressed that „there is no real security guarantee to the Baltic 
states without friendly Russia” (Pētersons 1999).  
 
Opposition of Russia was the biggest political obstacle to the Baltic membership in 
NATO. Its sharp negative position against the expansion of the Alliance towards east 
and the answer to the question whether admission of the Baltic states into Alliance 
will increase or decrease security in Europe means that the Baltic states always would 
have to take into account real relations between NATO and Russia (Jundzis 2000c). 
Western European politicians were confident that relations of Russia towards NATO 
would hinder integration of the Baltic states into the Alliance.  
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During the examined period NATO and Russia collaborated in parliamentary level in 
fight against international terrorism, organized crime, distribution of weapons of mass 
distruction as well as in organizing searching and rescue and peacekeeping operations 
in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Russia is one of associated member states in 
NATO parliamntary assmebly with the right to vote.    
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3. Near international environment of the Baltic Sea region. 
 
Cooperation within region framework is an additional element of the global security 
process. Baltic Sea region states (Ozoliņa 2000e) are brought together by their 
geographical location around the Baltic Sea which create stable totality of interaction 
and interests. Not only interstate cooperation takes place within the regional 
framework, but also sub-national one: Union of the Baltic cities, business cooperation 
etc. Active support of Nordic countries – Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and 
Iceland to the long-term democratic development in the Baltic states have turned the 
Baltic Sea region into unifying and cooperation – promoting environment. 
Cooperation among these states developed in differents formats – cooperation among 
the Baltic states, cooperation among the Baltic and Nordic countries as well as Baltic 
Sea Council of which Russia, Germany and Poland is a part. The aim of the 
cooperation is to promote development and to increase regional and wherewith 
European stability. However, the Baltic Sea region is not still considered a security 
community because of Russia, as a state, which does not share with the other region 
states common identity, values and norms and is not considered a part of the 
European security community.  
 
Security community is a peace community which presupposes that a war between 
community members is not possible. However, Russia still had an imperial ambitions 
and there was still a possibilty for military conflict. It justifies an assumption that the 
Baltic Sea region could not be considered a security community during the period 
examined in the thesis. 
 
According to Mouritzen, after the end of the Cold War two security communities 
existed in Europe – the Nordic security community and the EU security community. 
He points out, however, that there was no essential difference in the functioning of the 
Nordic and the EU security communities “for this reason, it is question of no practical 
relevance whether one ragards the Nordic security community of today as an integral 
part of the EU community or as a community of its own” (Mouritzen 2001: 303). The 
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main question was whether a security community, a creation of stable peace because 
of community and identity (Adler et al 1998) could be established on the eastern shore 
of the Baltic Sea.  
 
The Baltic states did not form a security community despite the fact that its hard to 
imagine them fighting against each other using military means although some 
territorial disputes existed between them. As resolving territorial disputes was among 
the preconditions for joining the EU, the Baltic states were able to manage this, which 
can not be said about the disputes of the same nature with the bigger neighbour – 
Russia.  
 
When we speak about the Baltic identity, it was very much an image created by West 
and the Balts never opposed to it partly to meet Western expectations and partly to 
separate itself from Russia and the sphere of influence of Moscow. There was also 
almost non-existent possibility of war between the Baltic and any of the Western 
countries. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania followed the formula “We belong to Europe, 
and Europe end here” (Mouritzen 2001: 305). The main security goals of three Baltic 
states were integration into NATO and the EU and it could be said that their 
membership would justify the view that they are a part of the Euro-Atlantic security 
community.   
 
Russia’s present continued to influence international security climate in the Baltic Sea 
region. Other states in the region could not ignore its presence in the region and had to 
take into account that its interests are not limited only to regional level but include the 
whole Baltic Sea region. It should be stressed that none of the states in the Baltic Sea 
region threatened the security of Russia or security of the region. However, Russia 
considered NATO enlargement within the region to be a threat to its security. 
Enlargment  meant  that  the Bal t ic  s ta tes  “wil l  make i t  to  the West”   
(Buzan et al 2003: 415) and become a part of the Europe security community of 
which Russia is not a part of. For the Baltic states, which were searching for security 
quarantees since their indepenedence was restored, establishment of security 
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community in the Baltic Sea region could mean firm security guarantees in addition to 
the guarantees NATO and the EU could give. However, no powerful regional security 
organization with strong commitments that would cover the entire Baltic Sea region 
was created. Despite this, a network of cooperative security existed in the 
abovementioned region, an example being the Council of Baltic Sea States (hereafter 
CBSS). CBSS was created in March 1992. Member states of CBSS are: Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and 
Iceland.  
 
CBSS is called a regional organization, but, taking into account its conference type, 
nature and narrow specificity of discussed issues, it is more correctly to call it 
multilateral initiative. Establishment of CBSS was an attempt to promote stability in 
the region but at the same time it is not a regional security organization. Baltic Sea 
states have different security solutions. In this situation it was not possible to form 
CBSS as a security institution for all states forming the Baltic Sea. Infrastructural, 
cultural, ecological cooperation within CBSS was emphasized. The implementation of 
regional projects, promoting of regional connections, etc. was important. 
Implementation of regional projects, promotion of regional connections, etc. was of 
importance. Though, the fact that CBSS was not created as regional security 
organization, did not exclude an opportunity to discuss security related matters, 
related to environment, fight against crime etc., in which the Baltic Sea region states 
had common interests. Despite the short time of existence, the Baltic Sea region 
became a region of high stability. The EU reckones with CBSS and it is important that 
exactly European Commission was the main source of financing of this project. 
 
CBSS had very high political importance because of the fact that Russian and Baltic 
representatives were able to sit at one table and discuss different issues (they do so 
also in the United Nations (UN) and Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), but not in such a narrow format).  
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CBSS ministerial sessions showed that also security issues are being successfully 
discussed. For example, in March 2002 in Svetlogorsk, Russia, was completed a 
ministers’ session, which was a retrospect to what has been done and discussion of the 
future priorities. The following cooperation spheres were highlighted in the 
declaration: fight against organized crime, cooperation in civil defence and prevention 
of non-military threats in the region, development of Northern dimension policy, 
economic cooperation. It confirms, that the Baltic states were solving their domestic 
security problems before integration into NATO not only within the trilateral 
cooperation framework, but more broadly – within the Baltic Sea region framework, 
which supposedly was more effective because “the Baltic Sea region was considered 
as one of the most stable in terms of security and rapidly developing regions in 
Europe and in the world” (Galdikaite 2003: 17).  
 
3. 1. International organizations. 
New security environment in Europe after the end of the Cold War with the new risks 
lead to transformation and development of international security organizations. 
International organizations were occupied with searching for new roles and tasks 
which they could implement in the future European security architecture, as well as 
for cooperation opportunities with other international security organizations in 
Europe.   
 
After the end of the Cold War, international society, maintaining stability and 
security, created mutually integrated network of international security organizations, 
so - called Euroatlantic security structure.  
 
International security which is based on cooperation, could be described as a strategic 
system with the core which is mutually related to official and non - official 
community and institutional network of liberal democratic states with common 
values. These states implement practical and “transparent” cooperation in economical, 
political and military sphere. Within the borders of security system, objectives of 
simple states in national security sphere are linked with four security “rings” or 
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circles, which strengthen the whole system. The first “ring” (individual security) – 
observation of human rights and defence within and outside state borders; the second 
“ring” (collective security) – maintainance of peace and stability in common space; 
the third “ring” (collective defence) – collective defence against external aggression; 
the fourth “ring” (distribution of stability) – an active stability ensuring in other 
regions, where ongoing conflicts could create threat to a common security, using 
political, economic and if necessary, military means. If we accept such system, then it 
must be admitted, that NATO remain the most effective because it is able to secure all 
four functions, in contrast to the EU, OSCE and the UN which do not guarantee their 
memberstates military protection against external aggression (Коэн 2001). 
 
The international security environment in Europe during the examined period was 
significantly influenced by the integration processes which found an expression in 
deepening of the EU integration and admittance of new member states, as well as 
NATO enlargement. A great part of European states was involved in transatlantic 
cooperation based which was based on common democratic values. NATO and the 
USA had leading positions in the field of collective security. NATO and the EU 
enlargement was a stabilizing factor in security system which resulted in the extension 
of the region within which stable and democratic political and economic development 
is guaranteed.  
 
Integration into the EU and NATO protractedly has been top foreign and security 
policy objectives of the Baltic states. However, i required diligent preparations with 
complicated review of development process. Both these organizations create the core 
of European security structure. Both the EU and NATO were significant to Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania because the Baltic states wanted to address their security 
problems together with similarly thinking states and to obtain security against 
possible threats with common forces. Even more, integration into NATO and the EU 
was associated with return to “West” and European way of life, prosperity and 
security (Urbelis 2003b).  
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With the help of international organizations small states can obtain 
internationalization of their security interests, they may widely use law and moral 
norms in order to influence other actors in the international system. During the 
examined period, integration processes in Europe developed dynamically and it is 
important to stress that security of the Baltic states was inseparable from that of 
European. Together with restoring of independence in the beginning of 1990’s, 
integration into Euroatlantic political, economic and security organizations, such as 
UN, OSCE, Western European Unity (WEU) became an integral part of the policy of 
the Baltic states.  
 
On May 9, 1994 the Baltic states, together with other 6 Central European and East 
European states, were granted status the of the associated partners of the WEU which 
is fully integrated into the EU.  
 
For the Baltic states integration into the EU was an essential precondition for 
economic growth, democracy and prosperity, as well as for increasing of international 
security guarantees. The membership in the EU for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
meant even more because of the globalization processes in the world due to their 
awareness that they as a small states with limited resources would not be able to 
engage in competition struggle and survive in the world which is lead by economic 
megasystems. The EU is not an alliance and can not guarantee security to its members 
as NATO does. However, it is a democratically created community where member 
states share common values and interests. Cooperation on internal affairs and justice 
is developing within the EU which opened an opportunity to new member states to 
solve internal security problems, fight against crime and smuggling more effectively.  
 
The EU is not a military union. For that reason, security guarantees which three Baltic 
states expected to receive, were not direct, military guarantees. Security provided by 
the EU membership strives mainly from the self fact of existence of the Union. The 
EU is the union of European most influential and richest states. It passed time 
probation and gained reputation and influence which makes it for one of the main 
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actors in the world politics. Simultaneously both inside and outside the EU, it has 
been stressed, that the Union needs clear manifestation of common political will in 
foreign policy and security related issues which would correspond to economic 
influence of this organization. Such an instrument is the EU Common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP) – one of three pilars the EU is based on.  
 
“Security project has always been and is still the basis of the EU. As an actor in 
security field, the EU does not correspond to any of traditional definition of this 
concept. It is not based on balance of power principle, not on the hegemony or a big 
power or collective defence. The most appropriate description of its role could be in 
its goal to ensure cooperative common security” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Sweden 1997: 11). Despite that the core of the EU project is economy, it is a 
meaningful security project for Europe and does not correspond to any of traditional 
security systems. However, in principle, it supports security model which is based on 
the interregional balance of power. 
 
Without doubt, membership in the EU has a positive influence on small states. It creates 
security community in Europe – situation, when a war is not considered to be a mean 
against the other state. It leads to stability and widens the space for political action of 
small states and prevents conflict situations between the big powers in western Europe. 
Cooperation within the framework of the EU is important in war against terrorism, 
international crime and illigal immigration. Despite the fact that the EU works on 
increasing its military capacity, it still has the central role in producing non-military 
security. The EU still has a long way to go to become a significant military power. That 
is why the Baltic states bordering big, unstable state with imperial ambitions as Russia 
is, considered NATO as the only provider of “hard”security against possible military 
threats.   
 
NATO is an important part of new Euroatlantic space. During the last ten years the 
Alliance has cooperated practically with all European states which are not its 
members. NATO views its relations with Russia important because long-lasting peace 
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in Europe could be maintained only if Russia will build new type relations with other 
states. 
 
It is improtant that Washington treaty does not anticipate any concrete enemy. Its 
attractiveness lies in Paragraph 5 which states that an armed attack against any of its 
member states to be considered as an attack to all its member states. NATO is 
considered to be the most effective and react – able international organization and 
Paragraph 5 declares the substance and strength of the Alliance. There are few basic 
tasks NATO has in the security field: maintaining of stable and non-changing security 
environment in Europe; remaining a consultation forum for its member states in 
addressing international issues and in cases when international events encompasses 
security risk for NATO member states; organization of self-defence and prevention of 
any kind aggression against any of its member states. 
 
The influence of a member state in international organization depends on its political 
will to influence and on its contribution to operations (Setälä 2004). Each member 
state has the opportunity to comment on issues before they are forwarded to the next 
level in the hierarchy of the Alliance, thus, ensuring presence of the small states at the 
table where decisions on international matters are made. Big powers do not always 
agree on all issues which mean that coalitions are formed within the Alliance. This 
increases opportunities of the small states to influence the agenda. It is an important 
factor for the small Baltic states especially when it comes to the matters relating to 
Russia, as this question is of a strategic importance for the three states.  
 
In a case of the Baltic states, each of them first of all was concerned about ensuring 
own security and at the same time demonstrating its loyalty to the USA/NATO on 
individual level, often competing with each other. The recognition that playing in one 
team and merging political will and resources would increase their possibility to 
influence came later. 
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Without doubt, bigger nations do have more influence over international matters than 
the small ones does. However, it is a great benefit for a small state to be at the table 
where decisions are made. That is why membership in the EU and NATO could have 
been used as a tool to consolidate a nation as a sovereign and legitimate entity in 
international politics and made it visible on the maps of great powers (Setälä 2004).  
 
Membership in international organization has its costs and benefits. In order to get 
benefits a state has to make its contribution. Speaking abotut NATO, participation in 
international operations which are important to the USA/NATO could be considered 
as an important tool to show loyalty to the Alliance and prove that an actor is ready to 
take the responsibility to share concerns about collective security. The benefit is the 
conviction that in a case if a threat to a member state occurs, it will get necessary help 
from the other members. Thus, it is in the interests of the member states to contribute 
despite the consequences membership brings on domestic level; basically, it means 
that it is important not to be a “free rider” (Kjølberg). 
 
The absence of the common threat after the end of the Cold War made NATO to 
search for a new role in the international environment. First of all the desire of the 
USA to continue using NATO as a central security policy institution and as a pool of 
its military power could explain the survival of the Alliance. Expansion eastwords, in 
its turn, could be seen as a part of the transformation process.  
 
Enlargement has brought the Alliance to the borders of the Baltic states. Estonia, 
Lithuania and Latvia were seen inseparable despite the different levels of readiness to 
become members of NATO. However, the Baltic states had different opinion 
regarding this issue. Lithuania posed not as a Baltic state, but as a Central European 
state and seeked unilateral entry to European organizations forsaking Latvia and 
Estonia. Estonia was following suit regarding its future entry into the EU and 
supported admitting at least one Baltic state into NATO so that others might later gain 
a hearing. NATO in its turn, had a recognition that only taking all three countries 
together with their joint resources could be beneficial for the Alliance. That is the 
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explanation why all three Baltic countries became was an important issue on the 
agenda of the USA and Europe.   
 
However, admitting them into NATO was one of the most difficult problems for the 
Alliance because of the opposition posed by Russia. It should be mentioned that 
internal divisions in NATO on this issue also took place. Who was the driving force of 
the enlargement process despite the costs it caused? Celeste Wallander argues that the 
leadership of the USA and determination to remain present in the European security 
through NATO as well as dissatisfaction of the existance of even smallest prospect that 
Russia could emerge as threat was the reason why USA remained commited (Wallander 
2000: 721).  
 
As NATO enlarged and approached the borders of the Baltic states, it faced security 
challenges in contemporary Europe. While the Baltic states were seeking for 
membership in NATO, Russia was showing dissatisfaction and stressing that outcome 
when NATO expands to its borders, is unacceptable. Russia even threatened to break 
cooperation with the West. The apparent irreconcilability in the positions of NATO 
and Russia, and the insistence of the Baltic states upon consideration for their security 
interests, obliged both East and West to collaborate on working out a security system 
for the region that respects both Russian and Baltic, not to mention Western, interests. 
Otherwise, this region could have become the flashpoint of a political conflict with 
possible future developement into a military one (Blank 1997). 
 
Baltic security was seen as part of European security and Baltic security is inseparable 
due to geopolitical and historical facts. This could serve as an explanation why 
Washington, as a central NATO player, took leadership in a process of enlargement 
despite the costs it brough and internal disputes on this issue. In return NATO wanted 
loyal members, which would not be only security ”importers”, but also security 
”exporters”. It was clear that each Baltic state alone is not ready to become such 
”exporter” due to the lack of resources and difficulties the defence sectors were 
undergoing due to the reforms. It was in the interests of NATO to make defence 
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structures of the Baltic states to meet its standards in order to make all three 
applicants qualified for membership. 
 
Another difficulty European and the US government met because of the intention of the 
Baltic states to become members of the EU and NATO, was deterring Russian threats. 
Russia opposed the Baltic membership in NATO because considered that the expansion 
of the Alliance expansion to its borders threatens its interests. While not being full-
fledged members, NATO did not have an obligation to defend the Baltic states if they 
were attacked. However, after they became Partnership for Peace (PfP) members it 
could not simply wash it hands and ignore Baltic regional security issues. As Estonia, 
Lithuania and Latvia at that time were outside any European security system, basically 
there were two possibilities – to let them face the pressure Russia was bringig to bear, 
attempting to get them in its sphere of influence, or to help them to qualify for 
membership and get three loyal to the Alliance members. The first possible scenario 
could have brought pressure not only to small and weak Baltic states, but also to 
European security and possible even lead to crisis. Therefore, in order to avoid such 
possibilies, western organizations were ready to meet covering costs in order to enhance 
Baltic security which once again should be stressed, is inseparable from European 
security. New member states were seen as sources of new capabilities to NATO. Their 
membership was seen as tool to shift focus of the Alliance from guaranteeng to defend 
from possible military threat to how potential members can help NATO in spreading 
democratic values around the world and share costs that bring participating in 
international operations (Setälä 2004).  
 
Volker Ruhe, Germany's Minister of Defense, wrote that the Baltic states are the 
practical testing ground for meeting the challenges of reshaping NATO missions, 
territorial scope, the relations between the United States and its European allies, 
partnership with Russia, and, in general, for building Europe they want to see (Ruhe 
1996: 33). On the other hand Washington recognized that if the United States will not 
lead in the formation of the Baltic (and European) security system other states will 
make deals without it and against its interests (Blank 1997). 
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 When it comes to the Baltic states, they shared a common understanding about 
European and global integration processes and a place the region has in this process. 
Together with integration into NATO and the EU three Baltic states had common 
foreign and security policy goals – facilitating of integration into European and 
Transatlantic security and cooperation structures as well as integration of the region 
into Europe in general. 
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4. Mutual relations among the Baltic states and significance of cooperation.  
 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are located in one geostrategic space. The three Baltic 
states are commensurable both quantitatively and qualitatively. The Baltic states were 
unified not only by the similar historical experience but also by the common future 
vision and common foreign and security policy objectives – successful integration 
into European and Transatlantic security and cooperation structures. The Baltic states 
viewed themselves as a part of Europe and had common understanding and attitude 
towards the matters concerning the factors of European and global integration.  
 
The Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are small, weak states with limited 
resources and capacity to influence international politics. They were also 
economically and military underdeveloped states which recognized that are not able 
to obtain security only with their own forces. Both quantitative and qualitative 
commensurability existed among the Baltic states. That is why integration into the 
European security structures was on the top of the security policy agenda of three 
Baltic states.  
 
The Baltic states had a limited power to influence international issues; they 
implemented cautious, low risk policy and simultaneously were searching for and 
using the avaliable methods and means for multiplying international influence.  
 
After disintegration of the Soviet Union, cooperation among the Baltic states started 
in the beginning of the 1990’s after the so-called „singing revolution” which took 
place immediately after the of restoration of independence in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. 
 
In May 1990 the Baltic states agreed on creation of the Cooperation Council of the 
Baltic states and signed ”Declaration on unanimity and cooperation among The 
Republic of Estonia, The Republic of Latvia and The Republic of Lithuania”. 
However, cooperation council has not been created. Primary common objectives of 
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the Baltic states were to attaint withdrawal of the Russian army and to obtain 
permanent independence. In order to achieve abovementioned goals, the Baltic states 
were able to coordinate their activities and cooperate in the areas which was important 
for them.  
 
After the ”singing revolution” passed, an assumption that political cooperation, 
namely, cooperation at the state level, will be the next step which would replace 
cooperation among the popular movements, was percepted as the logical development 
of interstate relations among Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
 
Parliamentary cooperation institution – The Baltic Assembly which was created on 
November 8, 1991 played an important role in coordinating cooperation between 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Somewhat later in July 13, 1994, the Baltic Council 
and The Baltic council of ministers was established, thus creating an institutional base 
for cooperation among three Baltic states. It should be mentioned that legislative 
framework for defence cooperation was created in a short period of time – from 1993-
1995 a number of laws, regulations, defence and security concepts were adopted 
(Urbelis 2003b).  
 
Russia could be considered as one of the most significant external factors that 
stimulated the cooperation among the Baltic states. Thanks to joint forces and help of 
international organizations, Russian army was withdrawn from Lithuania in 1993, but 
from Latvia and Estonia in 1994. In that way, objectives that initially had been 
brought forward, were fulfilled. 
 
Despite the existence of such conjunctive factor as a negative Soviet legacy was, 
which united the Baltic republics during the first years after restoring their 
independence, each of the three states began to realize in the course of time that their 
own ways to face political realities have to be found. Thus, euphoria, which existed 
shortly after the independence was restored, made room for necessity of engineering 
own means for realization of national interests.  
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 During the first years of independence the abilities of the Baltic states to implement 
foreign and security policies were limited due to insufficient diplomatic and economic 
reasources as well as lack of experience. Launching of joint projects and was a 
reaction to limited international communication channels due to the lack of resources. 
The idea of Baltic unity was cultivated more outside Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
than it was in the three countries themselves because the Baltic states did not have any 
experience in terms of sub-regional cooperation (Ozoliņa 1999c). Thus, at first sub - 
regional cooperation was limited due to insufficient resources, than it began to put 
obstacles to it as three Baltic states began to take opportunities at the regional and 
global level more actively.  
 
The desire to become members of western organizations and, thus, to expand the 
range of supporters was not the only factor that hampered interstate cooperation 
among the Baltic states. An absence of a distinct leader that could take responsibility 
for initiation and coordination of joint projects was among the main reasons why the 
tendency of cooperation decreasing was also present. Theoretically, Latvia could have 
taken a leader position as geographically it is located in the center of the Baltic states. 
In practice, the ”Baltic unity” was very much an external image as the Baltic states 
choosed to emphasize their own significance on their way to the EU and NATO. 
 
The cooperation among the Baltic states had a dual nature. On the one hand, interstate 
cooperation was seen at some point as an obstacle to reaching important goals – 
membership in western economic and military structures. In gaining these objectives, 
each country was searching for the methods which are the most appropriate 
particularly for it. At the same time, political realities and the fact, that in the eyes of 
international society the Baltic states were seen as inseparable unit, had positive 
influence on interstate cooperation. Joint projects such as BALTBAT, BALTRON, 
BALTDEFCOL is the evidence that cooperation among the three Baltic states was not 
only a myth.  
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On the one hand, closeness of Russia and its ambitions to maintain strict control over 
its so-called ”near abroad” were the factors which had positive influence on, and 
broadened the opportunities for cooperation among the Baltic states. It could be 
explained by the fact, that so – called ”Russia factor” brought about similar perception 
of threats to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Also the efforts to join NATO was a factor 
that broadened opportunities for cooperation among the Baltic states. On the other 
hand, competition was a concurrent part of interstate relations of the Baltic states 
when examining their way to Western security structures. Thus, is could be stated that 
Baltic cooperation developed unevenly and the dynamics of cooperation process have 
always been more dependent on external factors than on the internal ones (Ozoliņa 
1999c). 
 
Historical ties of Estonia and Lithuania with Finland and Poland was a significant 
external factor that had an influence on cooperation dynamics. Estonia which has 
strong economic and linguistic ties with economically strong and experienced 
democratic Finland, considered that it will gain more benefit from developing more 
intense cooperation with it then with the Baltic neighbours. When it comes to 
Lithuania, shorlty after gaining its independence, it considered Latvia to be its closest 
partner. However, after resolving territorial disputes with its neighbour Poland with 
which it has historical ties, Lithuania turned to cooperate with it more intensively. As 
in the case with Estonia, economic factor played a sufficient role here, too. Central 
European market seemed more attractive than the Baltic one which is considerably 
smaller (Ozolina 1999d).  
 
Latvian Professor of International relations Žanete Ozoliņa have stressed that ”from 
the aspect of unity the initial stage of cooperation between the Baltics was the 
brightest and the most active, since the Baltic States were aware of sharing a common 
historical experience and common prospects for the future i.e. either all three would 
reclaim independence or they would be redrawn into a ”new union””(Ozoliņa 1999b).  
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However, already in 1993, when parliamentary elections took place and foreign 
policy priorities were defined, it became clear that existing interstate cooperation 
among three Baltic states is not effective. As the EU and NATO membership were set 
as foreign policy priorities, cooperation among Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in some 
extent was viewed as a factor that could hinder western institutions to see the progress 
each country have reached independently from its neighbours. Unexperienced Baltic 
states, highlightening own achievements, did not fully recognize that cooperation 
between them was viewed by western organizations as an indicator of how they will 
act when membership in the EU and NATO would become a fait accompli.  
 
 The year 1993 was a turning point for the Baltic cooperation after Copenhagen 
criteria of the EU were set. According to indicators which were set as a base for 
evaluating readiness of the country to become a member of this organization, Estonia 
took a leading place and was named among the first group of contries to begin 
membership negotiations with. This lead to unequivocal reactions in all three Baltic 
states. This fact made understand that despite common historical experience and unity 
each has its own way to go in order to reach future objectives.  
 
Competition became an integral part of the Baltic interstate relations. It is difficult to 
say unequivocally whether competition played a negative or a positive role. On the 
one hand, it is a factor that could have promoted development in Latvia and Lithuania 
as it facilitated political desire to find shortcomings and work on improvement. On the 
other hand, it led to the uncertainty of whether to continue cooperation or not because 
each state after all was evaluated on individual ground.  
 
However, in order not to stay outside the process of integration and international 
decision-making, the Baltic states had to continue implementation of such already 
functioning regional cooperation projects as BALTBAT, BALTRON and BALTNET. 
It was hard to imagine one of three Baltic states to withdraw from the project 
unilaterally. Despite that participation in joint cooperation projects continued, 
competition among the Baltic states decreased. Laima Andrikiene, Lithuanian 
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Minister for European Affairs in an interview to Latvian newspaper Diena said that at 
that time existed ”a very serious competition, and during such processes, friendly 
neighbouring countries become alienated” (Diena, 1997). 
 
However, each of three Baltic states recognized that cooperation and coordination of 
common position concerning international issues of crucial importance should be 
continued and non of the three states showed an intention to step back from 
cooperation projects. An explanation, that could help bring the light to this twofold 
tendency, may be following: as Estonia was mentioned one of the most successful of 
the three states when it comes to the EU membership, but no such statements were 
heard from NATO, it proved the fact, that the EU and NATO enlargement was not 
directly linked. Thus, if NATO and its main player the USA see the Baltic region as 
unified security entity, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have to act jointly in order to 
succeed in becoming NATO members.  
 
It is clear that the cooperation among the Baltic states during the examined period had 
a dual nature. The reason why such tendency took place could be explained by the 
fact that none of the three states had enough experience to clarify why this cooperation 
was necessary and how to deal with it in order to get maximum benefit.  
 
4.1. Chronology of regional security cooperation among the Baltic states in 20th 
century. 
 
In 1919 – 1926 existed an idea about creation of ”sanitary cordon” which would 
include Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukrain and Byelorussia. This 
corridor was supposed to create a security zone between Russia and Germany. If 
created, it would be a security region or so-called ”vertical security belt”. From 1919 
to 1926 representatives of the abovmentioned states met in 10 conferences but an 
agreement was not obtained. In 1925 the idea about security corridor fully 
dissapeared. The following reasons could be mentioned: disagreement among Poland 
and Lithuania towards Vilnius district; refusal of Finland to participate seeing all the 
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contradictions; Ukrain and Byelorussia joined the Soviet Union, etc. The idea did not 
come true because it existed only in the minds of politicians; it was just a theoretical 
construction. Countries were too different, both politically and economically; they had 
a specific geographical location. The attempts to create a security region were 
hindered by the national security considerations of each state.   
 
In 1923 an agreement about defence union between Latvia and Estonia was signed. 
This agreement laid the foundation to further cooperation in political and military 
field. The agreement had explicitly defensive nature. Also Lithaunia declared its wish 
to join the agreement, but at this time disputes with Poland increased. This was the 
reason why negotiations were slowered down and at the end made an agreemnt 
impossible. Wherewith Lithuania excluded itself from the context of the Baltic states. 
In addition, also cooperation among Latvia and Estonia was not strong enough. 
Estonia was trying to become closer to Finland. In reality only Latvia emphasized the 
necessity of cooperation.  
 
In 1934 in Geneva Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed an agreement about the 
creation of the Baltic Entente. There were few factors that influenced the creation of 
the Baltic Entente: Estonia lost hope to conclude an alliance agreement with Finland 
and other Scandinavian countries; Poland became closer with Germany and Lithuania 
slid into complete isolation as soon as understood, that neither Germany nor the 
Soviet Union would help it to act against Poland; fascist regime strengthened in 
Germany; the Soviet Union became a threat; geographical and geopolitical location of 
the Baltic states was rather specific. The Baltic Entente was created too late; it was 
small and weak. That is why it was not recognized neither by the societies of the 
Baltic states nor on the international level. The Baltic Entente was not a military 
alliance; it was not able to ward off a military offence. There were few reasons why 
this organization was so weak: it was not a military alliance; economically the Baltic 
states compete among themselves in the world market; national interests of each state 
were of higher priority than the common ones; authoritarism in each of the Baltic 
states favoured solidarity cognition; Latvia was the only state that supported the idea 
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of the Baltice Entente on an ongoing basis; the Baltic states compete with each other. 
The Entente ceased to exist because of the following factors – there was no real goal-
oriented promotion of cooperation; Estonia continued to consider itself a 
Scandinavian country; different foreign policy orientations of the Baltic states; 
absence of unified conception about the main enemy – Estonia considered the Soviet 
union as a main enemy; Latvia considered both the Soviet union and Germany as 
enemies; but for Lithuania Poland and the Soviet union was the enemies. The 
differences in identification of external threats created weakness of the Baltic Entente; 
there was a shortage of regional self-identification; absence of common historical 
identity; people did not feel the Baltic unity in their hearts; there was a lack of 
cooperation in all spheres and levels.    
 
In 1992.-1993. a former defence minister of Latvia T. Jundzis on the analytical level 
proposed an idea to create the Baltic military alliance which could be NATO satellite 
organization. However, this idea did not get any support in the Baltic states. There 
were two main reasons why the idea of the Baltic military alliance did not get any 
support: 1) the Baltic states did not seriously consider the possibility that a tripartite 
military alliance could become a basis for security policy cooperation of any of the 
Baltic state; 2) NATO itself did not offer its support for the idea of creation of the 
Baltic military alliance as its sattelite organization. Lithuanian defence minister Linas 
Linkevicius said that Baltic military alliance would hinder the Baltic states from being 
admitted to NATO (Lejiņš et al 1997). 
 
4.2. Factors that promoted and hindered cooperation among the Baltic states. 
 
One of the most important indicators of security region formation is coordination of 
security interests and goals. Until the middle of the 1990’s the Baltic states had clear 
foreign policy priorities – integration into the EU and NATO. Though, official 
documents which reflected security visions of the Baltic states – threats and the means 
of preventing them, were not brought to the light simultaneosly. The National security 
concept of Latvia was adopted in June 1995. Integration into the EU and NATO was 
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set as a priority. Interconnection between national and international security was not 
incorporated in the concept. Opportunities for regional cooperation were evaluated 
only in the context of interaction between the three Baltic states and did not take into 
consideration the cooperation within Baltic Sea region framework. Estonian national 
security policy formulations which first saw the light in spring 1996, contained two 
basic security system bulwarks – national security and international security. Basic 
security document contained the view that implementation of two abovementioned 
elements is possible through developing of national armed forces and cooperation 
both with Latvia and Lithuania as well as within the Baltic Sea region framework. 
The Parliament of Lithuania adopted security concept in December 1996. It should be 
stressed that the role of regional cooperational in implementing security policy was 
not emphasized in this document.  
 
The cooperation among the states is a situation when participants subordinate their 
behaviour to actual or possible profitableness of each other by coordinating political 
process. It means that the policy of each state is aimed to decrease any negative 
consequences for the other states. Two important elements are the basis of the 
cooperation concept. First of all, the behaviour of each participant is oriented towards 
particular objective which could not be common to all the states, but it is presupposed 
that it will be reasonable and correspondent to own interests. Secondly, cooperation 
provides participants with some benefit or compensation which is not necessarily 
equal by size or form, but it should be mutual. Each participant, when cooperating, 
helps others to realize their objectives, thus atteining the own ones. Cooperation 
”takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by 
its participants as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a 
process of policy coordination ” (Keohane 1984), (Vaiksnoras 2002: 6).  
 
One of the most important steps in bulding cooperation among Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania was a creation of institutional base in the beginning of 1990 (Annex 1). 
Initial goals of the Baltic states were to obtain withdrawal of the Russian army and 
strenghten renewed independence. In order to gain these objectives the Baltic states 
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were able to mobilize and coordinate common resources. Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania were able to formulate which goal requires what kind of cooperation and by 
what means it could be achieved. Each of the three states did recognize that was in a 
similar situation and will not be able to gain outlined objectives faster than the others. 
 
Shortly after gaining the independence, differences in addressing economic, political 
and security problems became visible. Simultaneously to cooperation, competition 
factors were present despite the fact that Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia had common 
foreign policy objectives – integration into the EU and NATO.  
 
The way to gain these objectives was not completely identical because the Baltic 
states competed among each other for gaining maximum advantage from the progress 
they made individually. It should be stressed that the Baltic states were trying to enter 
the already functioning integration process with developed unified conditions and 
criterias. They were searching for the beneficial ways to fulfill acqui criterias. The 
speed, at which Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were approaching the integration was 
different: while Estonia in the beginning of the 1990’s considered that will become 
the EU member when the next enlargement round will take place, Lithuania at the 
same time considered itself a leader when it cames to NATO membership. 
 
It is impossible to deny that competition which was based on relative advantages, is 
an integral part of the market logic, first of all in the field of economy. That is why 
economic cooperation among the Baltic states and joint progress to join the EU 
developed more difficult. As director of Latvian Institute of 
International Affairs A. Lejiņš has stressed: ”though NATO (and the USA as 
expressed in the Baltic-American charter) put inter-Baltic co-operation at a premium, 
the opposite is true of the EU. The Baltic states earn no "points" in this regard from 
the EU; in fact, the EU approach - differentiating the three Baltic states - on occasion, 
gave rise to tension between the Baltics” (Lejiņš 1999: 6). It could be noted that the 
elements of competition prevailed when examinig cooperation among the Baltic states 
on their way to the EU. Although significant work was done in creation of unified 
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economic space (an agreement on free trade was concluded), situation during the 
examined period was far from desirable. More then this, it seems that in the economic 
sphere the Baltic states had two parallel policies. One, which emphasized the 
necessity to cooperate, common approach and understanding, was oriented towards 
external and internal propoganda; and the other one, which emphasied completely 
different ways of addressing economic, political and social problems. National 
identity of each of the Baltic states was uncomparably stronger then common identity 
of Baltics, which seemed to be more declarative and as it was already mentioned was 
more cultivated outside the Baltics.  
 
Already from the first days of establishing relations, the EU was acting as external 
factor which defined main cooperation spheres, thus, creating conditions to 
integration progress. ”The process of agreement preparation, its nature and 
registration schedule also witnessed that the EU approach towards the Baltic states is 
based on the assumption that the Baltic states is one group of countries where mutual 
connection would make it easy for these states to integrate into the Union. It could be 
said that until publishing of Agenda 2000 in 1997 the Baltic cooperation element was 
typical in the EU and Baltic relations” (Ozoliņa 1999d: 93). However, individual 
approach of the Baltic states towards the EU integration lead to decrease of trilateral 
cooperation. Mutual competition often turned to irrational manifestations and 
overshadowed cooperation because each of the three Baltic states reacted even to 
accidential messages of Western polititians.   
 
”Cautiosness of the Baltic states regarding mutual cooperation could be explained by 
the concerns that it could be perceived as an alternative to the EU and would hinder 
admission of the three states to the Union.Gradually developing the EU adaptation 
policies, one of the means in the realization of policy unavoidably was and would be 
mutual cooperation – as an addition to the policy of europeanization”  
(Ozoliņa 1999d: 93). 
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Different policy towards NATO was implemented by Lithuania which did not 
consider Latvia and Estonia as the equivalent cooperation partners. Lithuania 
considered that it is more longsited to cooperate with a NATO memberstate Poland. 
Lithuania specially stressed its individual approach towards NATO integration in 
1998 before Madrid summit. Nonetheless NATO demonstrated that Baltics are 
viewed as a single geopolitical unit and stimulated Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to 
develop mutual cooperation in security field also in the future. 
 
”When speaking about security of the Baltic states, all the three countries are viewed 
as a unit, and the decision which concerns one of them, should influence the two 
others. Partially it is necessary in order to save political efforts of the western states 
but it is not the only reason. It makes the Baltic states recognize political reality that 
despite the fact that Estonians have tights with Finns and Lithuaninans with Poles, 
three small Baltic states are able to ensure long-lasting security development only 
when they will cooperate as a unit” (Zaļkalns 1999: 133). 
 
Simultaneously with decreasing of the ability of self-defence successful cooperation 
on the regional level took place among Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. It is clear that 
cooperating, common defence abilities have increased and common security of the 
region have been gradually strenghtened. The cooperation among the Baltic states and 
more widely – within the Baltic Sea region did not replace broader integration 
processes, but was a mean to speed up the progress towards this direction. In addition 
thanks to the regional projects the Baltic states were receiving both intellectual and 
financial help from the western countries. 
 
Unlike other NATO memberstates of the last enlargement round which inherited 
”big” defence structures, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was forced to create defence 
sector from scratch. It was a challenge which had its vices and virtues. There was no 
need for the Baltic states to decrease armed forces, to deal with social security of the 
retired military persons and maintenance and change of outdated military technic and 
armament. Procurement of armament was often delayed due to the lack of finances. It 
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was difficult to coordinate armament procurements among the Baltic states because 
purchases often were big and, it could be said, even accidential.    
 
The most important requests, every NATO candidte country was asked to fulfill, were 
related to the creation of preconditions of effective cooperation with the few states of 
the Alliance simultaneously. First of all, it presupposed utilization of unified standart 
system of communications and procurement, sufficient level of NATO official 
language knowledge, coordinated legal base for operative participation in NATO 
international operations, legal and technical abilities to host reifnorcements of the 
Alliance on their territory. Other cooperation objectives turned into qualitative 
personal training, effective cooperation among civil and military officials and 
airdefence, as well as defence against biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. For 
this reason practical cooperation among the Baltic states within trilateral defence 
projects framework should be examined.  
 
4.3. Cooperation among the Baltic states in the military field. 
 
Since the independence of the Baltic states was restored, military cooperation has 
been a sphere, where interstate cooperation was the most successful. It began in 1991 
and could be explained by the urgent need to resolve two issues which were on the top 
of the agenda of all three states – ensuring independent existence and withdrawal of 
Russian troops. These two key security issues were the grounds to begin cooperation 
in security field in intergovernmental level. In 1991 The Baltic council adopted a 
resolution about the development of common security concept of the Baltic states and 
on June 2, 1992 defence ministers of the Baltic states signed a protocol about the 
cooperation in defence sphere. Military cooperation projects that were implemented 
during the observed period were based on this document. It should be mentioned at 
once, that not one of the Baltic cooperation projects was based on alliance principle, 
according to which, attack to one of the Baltic states would be considered as attack to 
all three Baltic states. The reason was the participation of the support nations in these 
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projects and it is difficult to imagine that those states could take part in the projects, 
which are based on alliance principles.  
 
The cooperation concepts are based on two important elements. First, behaviour of 
each participant is oriented towards a concrete goal which was necessarily not 
common to the other states, but it means reasonable and responding to own interests 
action. Secondly, cooperation provides participants with some kind of benefit or 
compensation. Each participant cooperating, helps others to realize their goals, thus 
fulfilling its own ones. 
 
Already in the beginning of the 1990’s an institutional base for the cooperation was 
established – The Baltic Assembly, The Council of Ministers and The Baltic Council 
ensured regular political dialogue and exchange of views about essential foreign and 
security policy as well as other important issues.  
 
According to Margus Kolga, the Baltic military cooperation during the period before  
NATO membership could be dividend into two periods. The first one, which started 
in 1993 when declaration for joint security of the Baltic states was signed between 
Defence ministries of three states, he calls „The quest for Western acknowledgement” 
(Latvijas Vēstnesis 1993). The second period – ”The quest for Western integration” - 
began in 1999 when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania started their Membership Action 
Plan process with NATO and lasted until March 2004 when all three became 
members of the Alliance. According to Kolga, there is also the third stage of the 
Baltic cooperation in the defence field – ”cooperation as Allies” which took place 
after three states jaoined the Alliance, but as the period examined in this thesis is 
limited to year 2004, cooperation on this stage will not be examined (Kolga 2006).  
 
During the first period military cooperation existed at all levels, both among armies 
and among the national guard units of the three Baltic states and the main part of 
meaningful military cooperation projects was initiated during this period. Since 1994 
annually updated activity plan was the base for trilateral cooperation. The defence 
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ministers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as commaders of the armed forces 
and other members of the military structures met on the regular basis.  
 
In November 1993 the concept of Baltic peacekeeping unit was proposed at the 
meeting of the Chiefs of Defense of the Baltic States. Already in September 1994 the 
first agreement among the Baltic states concerning the formation of Baltic 
peacekeeping unit (BALTBAT), followed by agreement with Supporting States was 
signed. As the three Baltic states had to build their defence systems from scratch and 
had limited resources and the experience level was quite low, BALTBAT project was 
an important field for learning to know each other and bulding confidence. It should 
be mentioned that the most part of decisions concerning the Project in the beginning 
stage was taken by the Supporting States due to the low level of experience of the 
three Baltic states in multination projects. However, BALTBAT gave Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania an opportunity not only to enchance the soldiering capabilities, but also 
to gain knowledge about the decision - making process and improve management 
skills, not to mention increased their self-confidence (Kolga 2006). 
 
In the beginning of 1996 BALTBAT Headquarters started operations in Ādaži 
training area in Latvia but in October it became clear that BALTBAT could be used 
for new projects. Therefore it was reorganized in infantry battalions which were ready 
to engage in peace-keeping operations (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia: 
1996). Thus, in 1997 Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian BALTBATcompanies joined 
Norwegian, Swedish and Danish peace-keeping battalions that were in service in 
Lebanon and Bosnia (Lejiņš et al 1997).  
 
The BALTBAT project was significant in several aspects. First of all, Baltic states 
proved that they are reliable cooperation partners, not speaking about the increased 
level of experience and confidence the military field working with other nations. 
Secondly, as the popularity of peace-keeping as a tool to establish peace in the world 
was growing, it opened to the Baltic states an opportunity to prove that they are not 
only security importers, but are also able to make contributions to security structures. 
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This was very important because it enabled three Baltic states to begin developing 
their forces from the very basic level which does not requiere any complicated 
training and advance military means as war – fighting capabilites do. The 
establishment of BALTBAT opened an opportunity to deploy the Baltic soldiers in 
Bosnia, thus helping to gain a lesson of „westernization” for the military personnel of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Kapustans 1998). These factors were fundamentally 
important taking into account the desire of all the three Baltic states to join NATO. As 
the US State Department Spokesperson Michael McCurry noted:  
”The Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion constitutes the first example of voluntary regional 
peace-keeping cooperation in the area; (...) this program would recognize regional 
cooperation, encourage Baltic efforts to improve NATO interoperability”  (US 
Department of State Dispatch 1994). This statement indirectly confirms that the US 
being the key actor in NATO, was interested in the Baltic states as it recognized that 
they have a potential to become not only security ”importers” but also security 
”exporters”. Looking from today’s perspective, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, being 
NATO memberstates, actively implement partnership programs with the countries 
like Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan.  
 
The second important joined military cooperation project implemented by the Baltic 
states was Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON). The idea about the establishment of 
joint Naval force unit first appeared in 1995 during the first joined training AMBER 
SEA – 95. In 1996 after the international conference which was held in Vilnius began 
the realization of BALTRON. Germany took a leading role in coordination of 
international assistance. In the first half of 1998 the Agreement among the Baltic 
states on the establishment of BALTRON was signed and later this year also 
Agreement among the Western support nations (Ministry of Defence of Latvia 1998). 
 
The main idea of BALTRON was similar to that of BALTBAT, namely, to establish 
the basis for closer cooperation among naval forces of three Baltic states and promote 
cooperation with Western navies. Official inauguration of BALTRON took place in 
August 1998. It participated as a naval unit in the ”Open spirit’98” training exercise in 
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September 1998 (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia 1998). This project 
was another step in developing joint procedures and conducting of joint planning, 
training and exercises.  
 
The third project that should be named here is Baltic Air Surveillance Network  
(BALTNET) which has its roots in the Regional Airspace Initiative, proposed by the 
USA in the beginning of 1990’s. The idea was to raise air-control management 
capability in Central – Eastern Europe, namely, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and 
Hungary. In 1995 an initiative to create an integrated air – surveillance system 
BALTNET appeared and in 1997 the Regional Airspace Initiative was applied to the 
Baltic states as the US Congress confirmed 10,3 million US dollars financing for 
establishing Air Space Surveillance center in the Baltic states. In april 1998 
governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania agreed to establish the Baltic Airspace 
Surveillance Center in Lithuania. BALTNET, as well as BALTBAT and BALTRON 
is also a multilateral project, which was leaded by a support nation. In this case it was 
Norway (Ministry of Defence of Latvia 1998). 
 
 As a researcher in Latvian Institute of International Affairs and a lecturer in 
Vidzemes university Jānis Kapustans stressed, BALTNET project is unique because 
”the establishment of a modern airspace control system in the Baltic countries can be 
seen as the first step on the way to establishing an air space defence system” 
(Kapustans 1998).  
 
The latest cooperation project for the armed forces of the Baltic states – Baltic 
Defence College (BALTDEFCOL). In June 1998 an agreement among Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania concerning the foundation of BALTDEFCOL was scored and in 
September 1998 an initial college staff began their work in Tartu, Estonia. The first 
course for senior staff began in August 1999. This military cooperation project was 
also supported by the Nordic countries. Sweden was playing a role of the project 
coordinator this time.  
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The four abovementioned projects were not the only joined cooperation projects in the 
military field among the Baltic states, but they were the most successful and 
prominent ones. The success of these projects made Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
initiate such projects as Baltic Command, Control and Information System 
(BALTCCIS) which was supported by Germany and the Baltic Medical System 
project (BALTMED), supported by Sweden. However, these projects did not receive 
much attention due to the lack of continuous interest, mainly from self Baltic states 
(Ministry of Defence of Estonia 2002: 23).  
 
On the other hand, the participation of forces of the Baltic states in NATO-led 
Implementation Force (IFOR) as a part of the Nordic Brigade and Stabilisation Force 
(SFOR) operations (BALTBAT was participating in SFOR since 1998, deploying 100 
personnel) demontsrated their readiness to join the Alliance and proved that they are 
not potential ”free-riders” but also ”security providers” which are able to make 
contributions by participating in peace – keeping missions. On the other hand, Baltics 
realized that despite the high level of motivation they still have a long way to go to be 
in a full compliance with NATO standards. The lack of experience and limited 
management capacity was among the main problems Estonian, Latvian and 
Lithuanian armed forces units faced during the participation in peace-keeping 
operations.   
 
The second period started in 1999 with NATO’s Washington Declaration and 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) when nine potential candidates including the Baltic 
states were named. Although Estonia, Latvia and Lithiania started to cooperate with 
the Alliance in 1994 when joined PfP programme after the presidents of the three 
Baltic states declared their intention to join NATO, the first official relations between 
the Baltic states and NATO started already in the end of 1992 when the three Baltic 
states became the memebers of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.  
 
Despite the fact that all the three countries had the same goals and faced similar 
problems and challenges during this period, consultations and coordination on the 
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working level was not held on the regular basis. Each of the three Baltic states was 
informed about successes and failures of the others but no attempts to work out 
common positions or take common actions were made (Kolga 2006). Possible 
explanation of such behaviour could lie in the belief that each of them will do better 
alone than together and that possible failure of one of them would worsen the image 
of the others, thus decreasing chances to join the Alliance.  
 
Estonia took rather painfully the decision of the Prime Minister of Lithuania Algirdas 
Brazauskas to send an official letter to NATO about Lithuania’s desire to be invited to 
become a member of the Allianc. Estonia’s frustration could be explained first of all 
by the fact that the abovementioned official letter was send shortly after presidents of 
the three Baltic states signed Joint declaration was signed. Secondly, Lithuania did not 
hold any consultations with Latvia and Estonia concerning this issue. It should be 
noted that it was Lithuania which began to promote the idea of inviting at least one 
Baltic state to join NATO. It recognizing very well that Western politicians are 
informed that exactly Lithuania reached the best results in reforming its 
defence and security sector (Vilpisauskas 2000: 12). This policy has been 
actively promoted after another event which lead to underminig of confidence among 
the three Baltic states, namely, when in 1998 only Estonia was invited to start 
negotiations on the EU membership (Urbelis 2002a: 34).  
 
The US – Baltic Partnership Charter, signed on January 16, 1998 was a significant 
event which forced the Baltic states to work together more actively. The multilateral, 
not bilateral nature of the charter played an important role in promoting cooperation 
which was decreasing due to the low interest of the participating actors (Kapustans 
1998).  
 
However, military cooperation did not reach the same intensity level as in the 
previous period and new initiatives were not implemented with the same enthusiasm. 
Very often they did not even reach implementary phase but remained only on the 
paper. Even when it came to the projects in procurement area, where benefits from 
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joint action could have resulted in reduction of costs, no goal oriented action was 
taken. As an example the acquisition of 3D air-defence radar TPS 117 by Estonia and 
Latvia could be mentioned (Kristovskis 2002: 21).  
 
A tendency to act individually led to decrease of information exchange. The lack of 
coordinated actions resulted in the fact that a number of tasks the Ministers of 
Defence delegated to their Chiefs of Defence in the Military Commettee were not 
fulfilled (Kolga 2006). However, some positive tendencies were visible during this 
period. Together with the growing luggage of experience and development of defence 
structure of the Baltic states, also their cooperation in this field came to another level 
and changed the focus. More attention was paid to further development of national 
defence capabilities within the framework of abovementioned projects, not to the 
projects as such. Though, the tendency of each Baltic state to stand for its own 
interests rather than to concentrate on the common goals, was visible.  
 
Among the main factors which promoted the cooperation in the security field was 
similar perception of security risks and common external security policy objectives. 
For the three Baltic states which did not have any real security guarantees before 
joining the Alliance, trilateral cooperation in security and political field could be 
viewed as a collective effort oriented towards the reduction of risks and maintaining 
of stability in the Baltic sub-region. 
 
 The cooperation among the three Baltic states has taken different forms. Periods of 
intensive trilateral cooperation and mutual interest in joint projects and consultations, 
for example, planning and implementation of common airspace control and naval 
surveillance systems, were replaced by the periods when indifference and “beauty 
contest” when each country was trying to show its own achievements, prevailed. 
Lithuania, compared to Estonia and Latvia, was more successful in building up its 
defence structure. Estonia, in its turn, was considered to be the most successful in 
economic field, if compared to its Baltic neighbours.  
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The three Baltic states had necessary prerequisites for successful cooperation. First of 
all, the three Baltic states are small countries with limited resources and none of them 
were claiming for hegemon position. This maintained the equality in the mutual 
relationship. Identical foreign and security policy goals – integration into the EU and 
NATO was an additional factor that favoured the cooperation. However, in practice, 
correct high – level political decisions taken by the Baltic defence ministers, were 
implemented only thanks to the supporting nations. Joined projects which did not 
require a great number of manpower and material resources but had concrete and 
narrow objectives and necessary equipment were able to move forward. Whereas 
realization of complicated and resource - demanding projects, for example 
BALTBAT, faced problems and delays. Diminishing support and enthusiasm towards 
the projects which lacked clear set objectives and capacity to reach the goal that was 
set in the beginning of the project, led the shadow on the necessity to start new joint 
projects.  
 
The recognition that projects required unexpected amount of resources and difficulties 
to keep mutual commitments due to ”the lack of experience and knowledge of the real 
costs of the defence for sovereign nations” (Kolga 2006) was a serious test to trilateral 
cooperation among the Baltic states in the security field. 
 
The cooperation among the three Baltic states has been very fruitful in the field of 
peace-keeping. The decision to combine efforts and create peace-keeping battalion, 
consisting of the representatives of the armed forces of the three nations in order to 
contribute to UN peace-keeping efforts, was a meaningful step towards the 
development of trilateral cooperation in the security field. Orientation towards 
participation in international operations was Janus - faced. On the one hand the lack 
of international experience on the initial stage was visible. On the other hand, 
however, it was a good pooling of the resources and efforts for the Armed Forces of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Vaiksnoras 2002: 12).  
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The assistance of the Nordic states to the Baltic projects could not be overestimated. 
Looking from today’s perspective, it was the first step towards the cooperation and 
mutual interoperability of the armed forces of the Baltic countries and Nordic armed 
forces which is a crucial precondition for joint participation in the international 
operations.  
 
Whether Baltic states form a sub-regional unit and this fact could be considered as 
facilitating integration, cooperation in security field have arisen mainly because of 
similar perception of external risks and threats. Geographic nearness and similar 
historical experience as well as compatible size without doubt, played a positive role 
in the initial stage of cooperation development. though these factors were secondary 
when establishing the cooperation within a sub-regional unit (Purlys et al 1995: 27). 
As it was already mentioned, the cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
was considered by the Western countries as a natural thing. As defence cooperation 
between the three Baltic states was considered a priori to be a good thing, 
“disagreements which unavoidably occurred in the process of cooperation were 
immediately interpreted as irresponsible behaviour on the part of the Balts and 
therefore came under sharp criticism from the supporting states” 
(Vilpisauskas 2000: 12). This fact allows to draw the conclusion that the image of the 
Baltic geopolitical unit and the position of the Western countries in dealing with all 
the three countries simultaneously rather than on the individual basis was among the 
main factors that promoted Baltic cooperation during the examined period.  
 
Aspirations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to become the members of NATO on the 
one hand could be considered as a fact that stimulated trilateral cooperation in the 
security field. The influence of the main Baltic “lobby” in NATO – the USA on 
promotion of Baltic cooperation was clearly visible. The creation of Baltic Action 
Plan for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which was “an attempt to solve the prblem of 
integrating the three Baltic countries into Europe without offering them NATO 
membership and assuring that the West is not neglecting them”, also played a positive 
role in promoting the cooperation among the Baltic states.    
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The plan was composed of three sections: assistance to the Baltic states in joining 
Western security institutions by improving coordination; encouraging to improving 
relations between them and Russian Federation. Part three was dedicated to the US - 
Baltic relations, including increasing of economic and military assistance as well as 
anticipated joint military exercise of the US troops and BALTBAT (British American 
Security Information Council). It should be stressed that the factor of financial 
assistance US promised to provide had its influence on promotion of the cooperation. 
This is true for both abovementioned multilateral projects which would not have been 
implemented without western support (Denmark and later Norway played and 
important role) and for the US – Baltic Partnership Charter which was signed on 
January 16, 1998. Strict position of the United States to sign a joint document despite 
the desire of Estonia and especially Lithuania to conclude separate agreements with 
the US, made three Baltic states work together, thus promoting the cooperation. 
Common NATO-compatible airspace control system which came true thanks to the 
financial assistance of the US and pressure to find common solution on this issue, is 
another evidence of the influence the US had on the Baltic cooperation. Thus, the US 
played a positive role in the promotion of the cooperation among Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania on the level where political will to reach mutually favourable results was 
needed. The cooperation among Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the practical level 
was promoted by the necessity to implement joint training activities in order to 
prepare for exercises with NATO countries. The fact that Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania have chosen the EU and NATO as their foreign policy priorities already 
presupposed the necessity of such cooperation. It was clear that going separate roads 
would take much longer than if coordinating political activities. Pressure from 
Northern neighbours and international organizations was an additional external factor 
which motivated the Baltic states to cooperate. It has been argued that Western 
support, particularly that of Great Britain and Nordic countries, which actively 
supported common Baltic military activities such as BALTNET, BALTRON and 
BALTBAT and BALTDEFCOL was crucial for implementation of PfP tasks and 
preparing for NATO membership. It also was a driving force which facilitated 
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trilateral cooperation in the area of security and military affairs (Vilpisauskas 
2000:12). 
 
It could be concluded that sub - regional cooperation among the Baltic states in 
security field was encumbered with the lack of resources and political experience, 
which basically lead to a situation, when three Baltic states began to search for other 
self-realization opportunities. Each of the Baltic states, choosing integration into the 
EU and NATO as a top priority issues, realized that in the initial period efforts and 
resources should be joined in order to claim membership in abovementioned 
organizations. However, when being potential members, their behaviour was very 
much dependent on such external factors as reaction and support of the EU and 
NATO to their successes or failures to implement reforms. Interstate cooperation 
increased in the periods when it was asked for, as in the case of Baltic – American 
Charter or when it was not possible to resolve a task or a problem individually. As 
soon as one of the countries was declared to have progress, increased its desire to 
mobilize resources and to fulfill all the tasks by its own, outspacing concurents.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Fundamental changes that took place in the world security system during the decade 
after the end of the Cold War also influenced also the Baltic states. After the bipolar 
world order which existed during the Cold War ceased to exist, strong fixed positions 
and easily modelled situations, also the time when a number of declarative plans and 
conceptual documents was of importance passed. The situation in the world, in 
Europe and in the Baltic Sea region developed very dynamic at that time.  
 
After the examination of different definitions and features of the small states it could 
be concluded that the Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are small, weak 
states. Dring the examined period three Baltic states had only limited resources and 
low ability to influence world politics, but also were also underdeveloped in 
economical and military sence. It should be stressed that the Baltic states fully 
recognized their inability to ensure security only with their own means. A typical 
feature of the small states is tendency towards collectivism, joining international 
organizations and internationalization of issues. The Baltic states are commensurable 
both in qualitative and quantitative means and had common foreign policy objectives 
and security policy priorities – integration into the EU and NATO.  
 
The engagement of the small states in the international organizations is an ability to 
cooperate, thus, multiplying security realization means thanks to assistance and 
support of other members.  
 
Insecurity is one of the fundamental features of the small states. It has to be examined 
taking into account the influence of the external environment. Small states are 
vulnerable to the circumstances created by geopolitical condition which could both 
improve and worsen security situation of small states and their ability to influence the 
international processes. 
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Limited resources lead to a situation when small states are vulnerable to different 
kinds of threats. It hinders competition with the other states in solution of global 
problems. After restoring the independence security of the Baltic states was 
threatened mainly by internal factors and the danger of these factors was sometimes 
stimulated by the tense relations with Russia.  
 
Even more after restoring independence all the three Baltic states were encumbered 
with the internal threats such as social and economic problems - social insecurity of 
the population, poverty, high unemployment level etc. Integration into the EU and 
NATO seemed a logical step in their movement towards modern, democratic, secure 
and economicaly strong states.  
 
It was clarified in the research that the cooperation between the Baltic states in 
security and defence area was a reality but had a wave effect. The cooperation was 
quite successful in defence field but limited to certain extend due to the lack of 
resources in all areas, and, especially in the military one. The lack of experience in 
managing joint projects also could be mentioned as a factor that hindered cooperation. 
The cooperation between the Baltic states was influenced by the external factors such 
as international organizations and countries which had influence in the Baltic region. 
Russia could be considered as the factor which brought Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
closer together as all the three countries perceived the bigger neighbour as a potential 
threat to their securty especailly during the first years after the restoration of 
independence. Another important factor which facilitated the cooperation between the 
Balts was that the United States saw the Baltic states as a unified region and the 
Nordic countries which wanted the Baltic Sea region to be a region of stability. 
Despite that the cooperation in security and defence area had its ups and downs, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithaunia showed that they have potential to work together.  
 
Institutional basis which was established in the beginning of 1990’s and ensured 
regular political dialogue and facilitated development of trilateral cooperation projects 
in defence area (BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET, BALTSEA, BALTDEFCOL)  
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served well to the Balts and helped to fulfil the goals these three Baltic countries set 
for themselves - membership in the EU and NATO.    
 
In the research the factors that facilitated the cooperation between the Baltic states 
were displayed: 
- The Baltic states are commensurable both qualitatively and quantitatively; 
- The Baltic states had similar historical experience and common foreign policy 
and security goals – integration into the EU and NATO; 
- The Baltic states began to build their defence sectors simultaneously and from 
similar positions. That is why it was necessary to cooperate in order to develop 
rapidly; 
- The Baltic states shared similar perception of European and global processes 
and saw themselves as a part of Europe. 
 
Despite that cooperation between the Baltic states was rather often overshadowed 
by such factor as competition, cooperation in the security area facilitated 
admission of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the EU and NATO, because: 
1) As the USA wanted to see Europe as a homogen region and the Northern 
countries wanted to see the Baltic Sea region as a region of stability, 
cooperating the Baltic states strengthened their security and defence 
capabilities, hence also common security of the Baltic region; 
2) Cooperation institutions of the Baltic states adapted a number of documents 
(Annex 2) which coordinated the Baltic cooperation and facilitated integration 
processes into Euroatlantic structures. NATO requirements to the candidate 
states (the Baltic states) were mutually interconnected with the Baltic 
cooperation; 
3) The participation in peacekeeping operations, rescue operations, mine 
clearance operations and other areas with their military forces and specialists, 
the Baltic states showed that they are not only consumers of European and 
international security, the so – called “free riders” but are also able to make 
contribution in strenghtening the international security.  
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4) The Baltic states working together in military projects (BALTBAT, 
BALTNET, BALTRON, BALTDEFCOL) developed the compatibility of their 
armed forces with NATO forces; 
5) Preparation of the Baltic states to the EU and NATO membership was not the 
end goal itself but the opportunity to increase their maturity.  
 
By reaching the objectives of the master’s thesis, the hypothesis, that the cooperation 
of the Baltic states in the security area facilitated their admission to the EU and 
NATO, is proved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 73
Literature: 
 
Adler, Emanuel and Barnett, Michael, (eds) (1998): Security Community. Cambridge 
University Press, United Kingdom. 
 
British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and Centre for European 
Security and Disarmament (CESD) (1996). NATO Expansion: Time to Reconsider: 
Basic Research Report. 
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/1996NATOexpansion.htm
 
Blank, Stephen J. (1997): NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What can Great 
Powers do? Report of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). 
 
Bleiere, Daina, Lejiņš, Atis (red) (1996): „Mazas valsts ārpolitskā autonomija” Gram: 
Baltijas valstis: Drošības meklējumi. („Foreign policy of small states”, In: The Baltic 
states: Searching for stability). Rīga. 
 
Bleiere, Daina (1997): Cooperation of the Baltic States with the Visegrad Countries: 
Security Aspects. NATO Fellowship Programm, Final Report, Riga. 
 
Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole (2003): Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Buzans, Barijs (2000): Cilvēki, Valstis un Bailes (People, States and Fears). 
Izdevniecība AGB.  
 
Cantori, Louis, Spiegel, Steven (1970): International relations of regions: a 
comparative approach. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice – Hall. 
 
Deutsch, Karl W. (1957): Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: 
International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Diena (1997). “The Baltic cooperation”. June 26. 
 
East, Maurice A. (1973). „Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models”. 
World Politics 25 (4): 556 – 576. 
 
Galdikaite, Inga (2003): Prospects for Regional Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Area. 
NATO/EAPC Individual fellowship Programme, Final Report, Vilnius.  
 
Hyde-Price, Adrian (1992): „Future security systems for Europe,” In: Colin McInnes 
(ed): Security & Strategy in the New Europe. London; New York. 
 
 
 74
Jundzis, Talavs (1996a). Baltic States: Cooperation on Security and Integration into 
the Europen Security System. NATO Research Fellowship.  
http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/9496/jundzis/01.htm    
 
Jundzis, Talavs (1997b): Mazo valstu ārpolitika un drošības intereses: teorētiski 
aspekti. Latvijas vēsture. (Foreign policy and security interests of small states: 
theoretical aspects. Latvia’s history). 
 
Jundzis, Talavs (2000c): Baltijas valstis, NATO un Eiropas drošības un aizsardzības 
identitāte. Latvijas vēsture. (The Baltic states, NATO and Europe’s security and 
defence identity. Latvia’s history). 
 
Kapustans, Janis (1998). Cooperation among the Baltic States: Reality and Prospects. 
NATO Research Fellowship. 
 http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/kapustan.pdf. 
 
Kasowicz, A.M. (1994): Pluralistic Security Communities and „Negative” Peace in 
the Third World. Working Paper Series on Regional Security (2). University of 
Wisconsin, Madison. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. (1984): After hegemony:Cooperation and discord in the world 
political economy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Kjølberg, Anders, Jeppesen, Morten (2001): En modell for sikkerhetstenkning etter 
den Kalde krigen. Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt (FFI). 
 
Kjølberg, Anders. Livet i Hegemonens Skygge - En småstats sikkerhetslogikk. 
Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt (FFI). 
 
Knudsen, Olaf E. (1996): „Analysing Small – State Security: The Role of External 
Factors”, In: Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe. Bauwens, 
W., Clesse, A., Knudsen, O.F. (eds). London: Brassey’s London – Washington. 
 
Kolga, Margus (2006): Quo vadis Baltic defence cooperation? Eesti Välispoliitika 
Instituut. 
 www.evi.ee/lib/valsipol2006.pdf
 
Krause, Volker, Singer David J. (2001): Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed 
Conflict. Ministry of Defence of Austria.  
 
Kristovskis, Ģirts V. (2002). North-Eastern and South-Eastern Dimensions of 
European Security – Regional Co-operation – Similarities and Differencies. NATO 
Defence College Seminar Report Series No.13. 
 
Latvijas Vēstnesis (1993). „Aizsardzības ministrijas Baltijas kopīgai drošībai” 
(Defence ministries for joint security in the Baltic states), No.170.  
 75
 
Lejiņš, Atis (1999). The Impact of European Integration process on Baltic Security. 
NATO Fellowship Programme/Final Report. 
 
Lejiņš, Atis, Ozoliņa, Žaneta (eds.) (1997): Small States in a Turbulent Environment: 
The Baltic Perspective. Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga. 
 
LeRoy Bennett, A. (1988): International Organizations. Prentice - Hall int., Inc. 
 
McCurry Michael (1994). „Expanded military and defence cooperation with the 
Baltic States”. US Department of State Dispatch, June 6. Speech transcript.  
 
Ministry of Defence of Estonia (2002). Baltic Defence Cooperation. Tallin. 
 
Ministry of Defence of Latvia (1996). Baltic Military Cooperation Projects. Riga.  
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden (1997). A Larger EU – A More Secure 
Europe: Study of the Consequences for Security of EU enlargement/Government 
Official Reports. Stockholm. 
 
Moshes, Arkady (2002). The Double Enlargement, Russia and the Baltic States. 
DUPI Working Paper 2002/04. 
 
Mouritzen, Hans (2001). “Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region: Real and 
Imagined”, Security Dialogue 32(3): 297 – 310. 
 
Ozoliņa, Žaneta (1996a). „Latvian Security Policy”. In: Lejiņš, Atis, Ozoliņa, Žaneta 
(eds): The Baltic States: Search for Security. Latvian Institute for International 
Affairs, Riga. 
 
Ozoliņa, Žaneta (1999b): Baltijas valstu sadarbība Eiropas Savienības 
paplašināšanas kontekstā (Cooperation among the Baltic states in the context of 
European Union enlargement). Latvijas vēsture. 
 
Ozoliņa, Žanete (1999c): The Regional Dimension in Latvian Security, In: Harmonie 
Paper 8. The Centre For European Security Studies (University of Gronongen), 
Netherlands. 
 
Ozolina, Žanete (1999d): The Impact of the European Union on Baltic Co-operation. 
Latvian Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Ozoliņa, Žanete (2000e): Latvijas drošības politikas reģionālie aspekti (Regional 
aspects of Latvia’s security policy). Rīga, Apgāds Izglītība 2000. 
 
Pētersons, R. (1999). Baltijas valstu drošība atkarīga no Krievijas (Security of the 
Baltic States depends on Russia), Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, 2. augusts.  
 76
 
Purlys, Vidmantas, Vilkelis, Gintatutas (1995): Cooperation between the Baltic 
states: A Lithuanian view, Positive and negative factors. NATO Review/Web edition/ 
No.5 – Sep. 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1995/9505-6.htm. 
 
Ruhe, Volker (1996). “NATO Positions for Growth”, Defense News, October 21. 
 
Setälä, M. (ed.)(2004). Small States and NATO. Atlantic Council of Finland. 
Occasional paper No.6.  
 
Urbelis, Vaidotas (2002a). The Baltic States: A Strategy for Co-operation. NATO 
Defence College Seminar Report Series No. 13. 
 
Urbelis, Vaidotas: (2003b). Defence Policies of the Baltic States: from the Concept of 
Neutrality towards NATO membership. NATO – EAPC Individual Fellowship Report. 
Vilnius. 
 
Vaiksnoras, Vitalijus (2002). The Role of Baltic Defence Co-operation for the 
Security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. NATO Individual Fellowship Report. 
Vilnius. 
 
Vilpisauskas, Ramunas (2000). Baltic States Membership in the WEU and NATO: 
Links, Problems and Perspectives. NATO – EAPC Research Fellowship.Vilnius 
University/Institute of International Relations and Political Science. 
 
Wallander, Celeste A. (2000). Institutional Assets and Adaptablity: NATO After the 
Cold War, International Organization 54 (4): 705 – 735. 
 
Zaļkalns, Gundars (1999). „Cik drošas ir Baltijas valstis?” Konferences materiāli. 
(„How secure are the Baltic states”. Conference materials). 
 
Коэн, Р. (2001): Безопасность на базе сотрудничества: новые перспективы 
международного порядка. Европеиский центр по изучению вопросов 
безопасности им. Джоржа К. Маршала. Гармиш – Партенкирхен, Германия. 
(Security based on cooperation: new perspectives of international order. George C. 
Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Garmisch – Partenkirschen). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77
 
Annex 1 
 
Cooperation of the Baltic states within the institutional framework  
 
Baltic Assembly2
The Baltic Assembly (BA) is an institution for parliamentary co-operation among 
Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. It was established on 8 November 1991. Each of the 
Baltic states is represented in the Assembly by 12-20 parliamentarians. The Assembly 
is a co-ordinating and consultative institution. Baltic Assembly sessions take place 
once a year. The BA has the right to make its views known to the national 
parliaments, governments and the Baltic Council of Ministers in the form of a 
resolution, decision, declaration and recommendation, while using the form of an 
appeal, proposal, or announcement when addressing other international or regional 
organizations. Between sessions, the Presidium of the BA may make decisions about 
current issues.  
 
The Baltic Assembly has five standing committees: Economic Affairs, 
Communications and Informatics; Education, Science and Culture; Environmental 
Protection and Energy; Legal Affairs and Security, and Social Affairs. Beginning in 
2003, the presidency of the Baltic Assembly was co-ordinated with the Baltic Council 
of Ministers, and a one-year presidency was introduced.   
 
The Baltic Council of Ministers 3
 The Baltic Council of Ministers (BCM) established on 13 June 1994, is an institution 
for governmental co-operation among Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The highest 
decision-making body of the Baltic Council of Ministers is the Session of the heads of 
government (Council of Ministers), which takes place at least once a year.  
 
The BCM is charged with ensuring the continuity of co-operation at the executive 
level of the states. It is responsible for co-operation among the governments of the 
                                                 
2 Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Latvia: www.mfa.gov.lv. 
3 Ibid. 
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Baltic states, as well as the co-operation between the governments and the Baltic 
Assembly. The BCM makes decisions regarding the implementation of 
recommendations of the Baltic Assembly. It promotes a broad and substantive mutual 
co-operation. The BCM has decision-making powers only if representatives of all 
three Baltic states are present. Decisions are made by consensus. 
 
To ensure purposeful activity by the BCM at the level of sector ministries, 
Committees of Senior Officials were formed in 1994. Until 2004 there were 18 such 
committees under the auspices of the BCM. Beginning in 2005, their number was 
reduced to five: Defence, Energy, Home Affairs, Transport and Communications, and 
Environment committees.  
 
The presidency of the BCM is rotated annually among the Baltic states. 
 
The military cooperation between the three Baltic states was monitored and guided by 
the following mechanism: Ministers’ Committee (MC), composed of the defence 
ministers, gives poilitical indications and takes the main decisions concerning 
trilateral cooperation in the defence area; Baltic Military Committee (BMC), 
composed of the chiefs of defence, represents higher military authority and 
implements the decisions taken by the defence ministers, provides evaluation of 
common projects from the military point of view and introduces propositions for 
further cooperation. 
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Annex 2 
 
AGREEMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS 
 
1994 
 
• Agreement on Baltic Parliamentary and Governmental Co-operation between 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; 
• Terms of Reference of the Baltic Council of Ministers; 
• Regulations for the Committees of Senior Officials; 
• Agreement concerning the Establishment and Formation of Joint Peacekeeping 
Unit; 
• Agreement concerning the co-operation on the National border guards; 
• Agreement on juridical assistance and legal relations; 
• Statement on Baltic Co-operation; 
• Joint Comunique’ and statement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the 
Baltic states; 
• Statement on celebration of national holidays of the Baltic states; 
 
1995 
 
• Frame Agreement on Co-operation in the field of Defence; 
• Agreement on visa-free traveling; 
• Agreement on the re-admission of persons residing illegally; 
• Agreement and Protocol on migration policy; 
• Agreement on co-operation in the field of environmental protection; 
• Resolution adopting the first annual Plan of Action of the Baltic Council of 
Ministers; 
• Statement on the activities of the BMC; 
 
1996 
 
• Protocol on Co-operation between the Baltic Assembly and the Baltic Council 
of Ministers; 
• Bilateral agreements on protection of investments; bilateral agreements on 
aviation; 
• Two statements on the activities of the BMC; 
• Joint statements on the Vienna conclusions and CFE Treaty; 
 
1997 
 
• Free Trade Agreement on Trade in Agricultural Products; 
• Memorandum of Understanding on establishing Baltic Battalion; 
• Memorandum of Understanding on establishing Baltic Naval Squadron; 
• Bilateral agreements on social security; 
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• Protocol, joint statement and basic principles on Baltic Governments Data 
Communications System; 
• Joint statements on the progress of integration into the EU; 
• Statement concerning regional airspace initiative; 
• Resolution on customs union; 
• Resolution on the improvement of transit transport; 
• Statement on the activities of the BMC; 
• Resolutions on common economic area and EU Third Pillar issues; 
 
1998 
 
• Agreement on abolition of non-tariff barriers to trade; 
• Agreement on Baltic Common Transit Procedure; 
• Agreement on co-operation in energy sector; 
• Resolutions on the activities of the BMC; 
• Resolutions adopting the Plan of actions for 1998-1999; 
 
1999 
 
• Agreement on Baltic Common Transit Procedure; 
• Agreement on Consular Assistance and Co-operation; 
• Agreement concerning the Baltic Battalion; 
• Agreement concerning the Establishment of the Baltic Naval Squadron; 
• Agreement on the Establishment of the Baltic Air Surveillance Network; 
• Baltic Energy Strategy; 
• Resolution on the activities of the BMC; 
• Resolution adopting the Plan of actions for 1999-2000; 
 
2000 
 
• Agreement concerning the Baltic Defence College; 
• Agreement on Merchant Shipping; 
• Agreement concerning the protection of witnesses and victims; 
• Bilateral agreements on mutual protection of classified information; 
• Resolution on the activities of the BMC. 
 
2001 
 
• Bilateral agreements on mutual assistance in disaster situations; 
• Memorandum of Understanding on the administration, financing and 
management of of the Baltic batallion. 
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2002 
 
• Memorandum of Understanding on establishment, functioning, management 
and administration of the Baltic Naval Diving Training Center; 
• Memorandum on the Baltic common market of electric energy; 
• Agreement on copperation within tourism area. 
 
2003 
 
• Memorandum of Understanding on functioning, administration and 
management of the Baltic defence college. 
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